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fix(onramper): authorize V2 checkout with wallet sessions - #71
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Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Behind an IPv4 proxy on a dual-stack listener, users can share one rate-limit bucket. Normal traffic can then block wallet sign-in and checkout. Normalize IPv4-mapped addresses before merging. The local setup documentation also needs portable paths. Pre-merge checks |
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @packages/shared-utils/src/auth/client-ip.ts:
- Around line 9-12: Update clientIp to normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses to
IPv4 before comparing the socket address and forwarded hops against
trustedProxies. Use the normalized addresses for trust checks and the returned
client IP, while preserving the existing validation and hop-limit behavior.
Review comments at @README.md:
- Line 237: Update the local setup instructions in README.md to refer to the
backend and paired web checkouts without fixed worktree names, and replace the
unavailable /tmp launcher fallback with reproducible steps to obtain and use
Yarn 4.7. Apply the same portable checkout guidance to the web-worktree
instruction.
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📒 Files selected for processing (28)
.dockerignore.github/workflows/ci.yml.railwayignoreREADME.mdapps/user-service/.env.exampleapps/user-service/src/app.module.tsapps/user-service/src/onramper/checkout.test.tsapps/user-service/src/onramper/config.tsapps/user-service/src/onramper/onramper-paused.guard.tsapps/user-service/src/onramper/onramper-paused.test.tsapps/user-service/src/onramper/onramper.controller.tsapps/user-service/src/onramper/sign-widget.test.tsapps/user-service/src/onramper/sign-widget.tsapps/user-service/src/onramper/wallet-auth.tsapps/user-service/src/onramper/wallet-proof.test.tsjest.security.config.cjspackage.jsonpackages/shared-utils/src/auth/client-ip.tspackages/shared-utils/src/auth/rate-limit.tspackages/shared-utils/src/index.tsprisma/migrations/20261007000000_security_limits/migration.sqlprisma/migrations/20261007000100_onramper_intents/migration.sqlprisma/migrations/20261009000000_onramper_wallet_auth/migration.sqlprisma/schema/onramper.prismaprisma/schema/security.prismascripts/onramper-local-db.mjsscripts/onramper-local-smoke.tsscripts/onramper-local.ts
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Description
Onramper checkout currently relies on a browser-held V1 signing secret. Move signing to user-service with a server-only Ed25519 V2 key and require proof of destination-wallet ownership before producing a checkout URL.
The backend creates a canonical, five-minute SIWE challenge, consumes it once after verification, and issues a fifteen-minute wallet session. Checkout destinations are derived from that session; intents are bound to the same session and consumed atomically. Both issuance and redemption require a valid wallet proof, exact application origin, and shared database quotas. Logout cascades to outstanding intents. Checkout is disabled unless
ONRAMPER_CHECKOUT_ENABLED=true.Use
ONRAMPER_V2_PRIVATE_KEYexclusively; no legacy signing-key fallback. Public-access metadata bypasses the separate service/device guard while the dedicated wallet-session and pause guards protect checkout. Non-EVM assets remain excluded; contract wallets require configured trusted RPCs and fail closed when verification is unavailable.Risk
High: introduces authentication tables, a cascading session/intent relation, and provider signing authority. The wallet-auth migration deletes existing anonymous intents. Keep checkout paused during deployment and rollback. Preserve both dedicated Onramper guards when combining with microservices #68.
Deployment
Pair with web #12740. Deploy the backend before the frontend. Apply the security-limit, intent, and wallet-auth migrations once per database. Configure provider API key,
ONRAMPER_V2_PRIVATE_KEY, exact app/redirect origins, provider endpoints, and trusted proxy peers. Register the matching V2 public key with Onramper.The development signer key, paused checkout setting, and exact
https://develop.web-29e.pages.devapp/redirect origin are configured in Railway develop. The backend CORS configuration includes the checkout origin while preserving other service origins.The production V2 private key has been provisioned in Railway microservices / production / user-service without triggering deployment. The public key has been sent to Onramper by the owner; registration/activation confirmation is pending. Static outbound IPs, staging API-key assignment, and the exact QA app origin remain pending. The separate staging key is now provisioned in the develop environment; its API-key assignment and provider registration remain pending.
Keep
ONRAMPER_CHECKOUT_ENABLED=falseuntil real Onramper staging acceptance and coordinated rollout. Local simulation is not provider acceptance. Revoke the compromised V1 secret independently; retaining an old variable does not contain its exposure. Never restore browser signing during rollback.Testing
Engineering
47 backend security tests passed locally, including actual PostgreSQL concurrency across two app replicas, shared quotas, challenge/intent replay, cross-wallet and cross-session access, expiry, logout, wrong origins/signatures/networks, and refusal to use a legacy key when the V2 key is missing. Full TypeScript, full lint, and all 126 existing backend tests passed after updating to current develop. The security suite is now included in GitHub CI; Lint and Test passed on final head
0feae70.The backend README documents the isolated local database, generated-key provider simulator, live disposable-wallet smoke test, and PostgreSQL test commands. Generated private keys are ignored by Git and excluded from Docker and Railway uploads.
Contract-wallet RPC responses are mocked in automated tests. Test real supported contract wallets in staging. Verify actual Onramper signature acceptance, fixed destination, expiry/nonce behavior, and return URLs before enabling checkout.
Operations
Use Engineering's paired web QA URL and provider test environment. Test ETH on Ethereum / USD 100, connect a test EVM wallet, approve the sign-in message, and check that the widget preserves destination, amount, asset, and action. Repeat Sell with a suitable test fixture. Reject the wallet signature, enter a destination the wallet does not control, change wallets during signing, replay a checkout URL, and simulate signer unavailability: each must prevent an unauthorized checkout.
The owner confirmed the local browser Buy flow displayed “Wallet-authorized checkout passed” on 12 October 2026. This was simulation only, with no purchase or transfer. Backend negative smoke checks also passed.
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