Fix remaining Section 6 typos

contents/english/6-0-from-⿻-to-reality.md

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
 
 ⿻ has the tangible potential, in the next decade, to transform almost every sector of society.  Examples we study are:
 
-1. The workplace, where we believe it could raise economic output by 10% and increase the growth rate by a percentage point;
-2. Health, where we believe it can extend human life by two decades;
-3. Media, where it can heal the divides opened by social media, provide sustainable funding, expand participation and dramatically increase press freedom;
-4. Environment, where it is core to addressing most of the serious environmental problems we face, perhaps even more so than traditional "green" technologies;
+1. The workplace, where we believe it could raise economic output by 10% and increase the growth rate by a percentage point.
+2. Health, where we believe it can extend human life by two decades.
+3. Media, where it can heal the divides opened by social media, provide sustainable funding, expand participation, and dramatically increase press freedom.
+4. Environment, where it is core to addressing most of the serious environmental problems we face, perhaps even more so than traditional "green" technologies.
 5. Learning, where it can upend the linear structure of current schooling to allow far more diverse and flexible, lifelong learning paths.
 
 While we do not detail them here, we also expect fundamental effects in a wide range of other areas, including energy, where it can help underpin a fundamental transition from the "hunter-gatherer" model of fossil fuels to the "agricultural" model of directly harnessing solar energy.
@@ -20,11 +20,11 @@ In this section, we therefore try to bring the potential impact of ⿻ down to t
 
 Radical social and technological change holds an irresistible allure to human imagination, yet so often ends in tragedy, as the Beatles lamented in their social ballad "[Revolution](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BGLGzRXY5Bw)".  Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way found in a recent analysis that not a single violent revolution in the twentieth century led to lasting democratic government.[^LevWay]  Yet we can all think of many dramatic changes for the better in human history, from the dramatic advances in information and communications technologies of the twentieth century to the establishment of a diversity of free and democratic governments around the world over the last three hundred years.
 
-What allows for peaceful and beneficial, yet dramatic, progress?  In her classic treatise on the topic, social philosopher Hannah Arendt contrasts the American and French Revolutions.[^OnRevolution]  The American Revolution, she argues, grew out of local democratic experiments inspired by migrants exploring ancient ideals (both from their own past and, as we have recently learned, that of their new neighbors) to build a life together in a new and often hazardous setting.[^GraeberWengrow]  As they traded ideas and built on related concepts circulating at the time, they came to a broad conclusion that they had discovered something more general about governance that contrasted to how it was practiced in Britain.  This gave what Arendt calls "authority" (similar to what in our ["Association and ⿻ Publics"](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/4-2/eng/) chapter we call "legitimacy") to their expectations of democratic republican government.  Their War of Independence against Britain allowed this authoritative structure to be empowered in a manner that, for all its inconsistencies, hypocrisies and failures, has been one of the more enduring and progressive examples of social reform.
+What allows for peaceful and beneficial, yet dramatic, progress?  In her classic treatise on the topic, social philosopher Hannah Arendt contrasts the American and French Revolutions.[^OnRevolution]  The American Revolution, she argues, grew out of local democratic experiments inspired by migrants exploring ancient ideals (both from their own past and, as we have recently learned, that of their new neighbors) to build a life together in a new and often hazardous setting.[^GraeberWengrow]  As they traded ideas and built on related concepts circulating at the time, they came to a broad conclusion that they had discovered something more general about governance that contrasted to how it was practiced in Britain.  This gave what Arendt calls "authority" (similar to what in our ["Association and ⿻ Publics"](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/4-2/eng/) chapter we call "legitimacy") to their expectations of democratic republican government.  Their War of Independence against Britain allowed this authoritative structure to be empowered in a manner that, for all its inconsistencies, hypocrisies, and failures, has been one of the more enduring and progressive examples of social reform.
 
 The French Revolution, on the other hand, was born of widespread popular dissatisfaction with material conditions, which they sought to redress immediately by seizing power, long before they had gained authority for, or even detailed, potential alternative forms of governance.  While this led to dramatic social upheavals, many of these were quickly reversed and/or were accompanied by significant violence.  In this sense, the French Revolution, while polarizing and widely discussed, failed in many of its core aspirations.  By placing immediate material demands and the power to achieve them ahead of the process of building authority, the French Revolution burdened the delicate process of building social legitimacy for a new system with more weight than it could bear.  The French Revolution demanded, and got, bread; the American demanded, and got, freedom.
 
-While Arendt's example is drawn from the political sphere, it resonates with literature on innovation in a wide range of fields from evolutionary biology to linguistics. While the precise results differ, this work all indicates that dramatic innovation thrives in environments where a diversity of "groups" (e.g. linguistic, economic or biological) that are internally tightly connected and externally loosely connected interact.[^NetworkStructure]  This allows innovation to gain the necessary scale and show its resilience, and then to spread.  More connected structures or more centralized ones either stifle innovation or make it dangerous, as changes are only occasionally net benefits.  More disconnected structures do not allow innovation to spread.
+While Arendt's example is drawn from the political sphere, it resonates with literature on innovation in a wide range of fields from evolutionary biology to linguistics. While the precise results differ, this work all indicates that dramatic innovation thrives in environments where a diversity of "groups" (e.g. linguistic, economic, or biological) that are internally tightly connected and externally loosely connected interact.[^NetworkStructure]  This allows innovation to gain the necessary scale and show its resilience, and then to spread.  More connected structures or more centralized ones either stifle innovation or make it dangerous, as changes are only occasionally net benefits.  More disconnected structures do not allow innovation to spread.
 
 [^NetworkStructure]: R. A. Fisher,  *The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1930).  James Milroy and Lesley Milroy, "Linguistic Change, Social Network and Speaker Innovation", *Journal of Linguistics* 21, no. 2: 339-384. Gretchen McCulloch, *Because Internet: Understanding the New Rules of Language* (New York: Riverhead, 2019). Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar and Sarath Pattathil, "Learning, Diversity and Adaptation in Changing Environments: The Role of Weak Links" (2023) at https://www.nber.org/papers/w31214.
 
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ The basic challenge is that "experimentation with" is dangerous when paired with
 [^Lensman]: Daron Acemoglu and Todd Lensman, *Regulating Transformative Technologies* (2023) at https://www.nber.org/papers/w31461.
 
 
-In particular, even when technologies are successfully developed in the interests of the communities harnessing them, accounting for all the systemic harms they may create in these communities, they still may have significant spillovers on those not among this early adopter community.  The key danger is that technologies may be usable as weapons or otherwise harnessed by the community to benefit at the expense of others, a far more common effect than may appear at first glance because even "helpful" and "harmless" tools may endow the (often-privileged) early adopted community with social and economic advantages that they can use to subjugate, marginalize or colonize others.  As Microsoft's President Brad Smith frequently repeats, most tools can also be used as weapons.[^toolsweapons]  This "competitive" effect has some benefits, in spurring adoption by and spread across communities seeking to harness the benefit of the tools partly in their rivalry and potentially by doing so creating pressure to harness and resolve resulting rivalries.  But it can also, at best, create exclusion and inequality that undermines the basis of ⿻ freedom and, at worst, can lead to "arms race" dynamics that undermine the benefits of new tools and instead turn them into universal dangers.  
+In particular, even when technologies are successfully developed in the interests of the communities harnessing them, accounting for all the systemic harms they may create in these communities, they still may have significant spillovers on those not among this early adopter community.  The key danger is that technologies may be usable as weapons or otherwise harnessed by the community to benefit at the expense of others, a far more common effect than may appear at first glance because even "helpful" and "harmless" tools may endow the (often-privileged) early adopted community with social and economic advantages that they can use to subjugate, marginalize, or colonize others.  As Microsoft's President Brad Smith frequently repeats, most tools can also be used as weapons.[^toolsweapons]  This "competitive" effect has some benefits, in spurring adoption by and spread across communities seeking to harness the benefit of the tools partly in their rivalry and potentially by doing so creating pressure to harness and resolve resulting rivalries.  But it can also, at best, create exclusion and inequality that undermines the basis of ⿻ freedom and, at worst, can lead to "arms race" dynamics that undermine the benefits of new tools and instead turn them into universal dangers.
 
 [^toolsweapons]: Brad Smith and Carol Ann Browne, *Tools and Weapons: The Promise and the Peril of the Digital Age* (New York: Penguin, 2019).
 
@@ -101,11 +101,11 @@ There are many kinds of communities at this scale.  Geographically, this is roug
 
 Perhaps the two most prominent sites of experimentation with ⿻ we have highlighted above are Taiwan and web3 communities.  These two sites share some important characteristics, and yet also sharply diverge in many ways both in terms of their character and the ⿻ applications they have focused on.  Both are roughly the same size. In 2021, web3 applications (dApps) had about 1.5 million monthly active users, though only a fraction of these actively participated in the most ⿻-adjacent services, such as GitCoin.  The ⿻ services of all kinds built by the g0v community in Taiwan have reached similar numbers [^TaiwanCommunity].  The types of diversity in each community, however, are radically different.
 
-While statistics are not entirely reliable, web3 users are spread quite broadly around the globe according to patterns similar to the internet.  However, users tend to be extremely technically sophisticated, skew male, very young, and, anecdotally based on our experience in the space, tend to be atheistic, politically right of center, and ethnically of European, Semitic and Asian origin.[^StateofCrypto]  Participants in the Taiwanese digital ecosystem are obviously mostly from Taiwan and thus mostly of the ethnicities represented there.  But they are more diverse in age, technical background, political perspective and religious background.[^Web3Inclusivity] 
+While statistics are not entirely reliable, web3 users are spread quite broadly around the globe according to patterns similar to the internet.  However, users tend to be extremely technically sophisticated, skew male, very young, and, anecdotally based on our experience in the space, tend to be atheistic, politically right of center, and ethnically of European, Semitic and Asian origin.[^StateofCrypto]  Participants in the Taiwanese digital ecosystem are obviously mostly from Taiwan and thus mostly of the ethnicities represented there.  But they are more diverse in age, technical background, political perspective, and religious background.[^Web3Inclusivity]
 
-The two ecosystems have also focused on different sides of the spectrum of ⿻ we discussed in the previous part of the book.  Taiwan has focused primarily on the deeper and narrower applications of ⿻ and the fundamental protocols (identity and access) that support these most strongly.  Global web3 communities have focused on the shallower and more inclusive applications and the fundamental protocols (association, commerce and contract) that most support these.
+The two ecosystems have also focused on different sides of the spectrum of ⿻ we discussed in the previous part of the book.  Taiwan has focused primarily on the deeper and narrower applications of ⿻ and the fundamental protocols (identity and access) that support these most strongly.  Global web3 communities have focused on the shallower and more inclusive applications and the fundamental protocols (association, commerce, and contract) that most support these.
 
-Both have been critical early testbeds for ⿻, yet measuring them against our criteria also illustrates their limitations.  The Taiwan ecosystem is larger than required for many of the applications developed there, which is likely why it has hosted a range of subcommunities (that they often call "data coalitions") engaging in more advanced experiments supported by the broader ecosystem.  The Taiwan ecosystem has strong potential for prestige in Asia and many of the countries typically called democracies, while the geopolitical conflicts surrounding it create some challenges in making it a seed for fully equitable global spread.  Web3 communities, on the other hand, may actually be a bit small and homogeneous to allow for a fully robust test of whether new market institutions can rival the reach of capitalism.  Furthermore, many of the scandals that have plagued the web3 space endanger its ability to generally serve as a beacon of innovation that can equitably spread.
+Both have been critical early testbeds for ⿻ yet measuring them against our criteria also illustrates their limitations.  The Taiwan ecosystem is larger than required for many of the applications developed there, which is likely why it has hosted a range of subcommunities (that they often call "data coalitions") engaging in more advanced experiments supported by the broader ecosystem.  The Taiwan ecosystem has strong potential for prestige in Asia and many of the countries typically called democracies, while the geopolitical conflicts surrounding it create some challenges in making it a seed for fully equitable global spread.  Web3 communities, on the other hand, may actually be a bit small and homogeneous to allow for a fully robust test of whether new market institutions can rival the reach of capitalism.  Furthermore, many of the scandals that have plagued the web3 space endanger its ability to generally serve as a beacon of innovation that can equitably spread.
 
 
 It is therefore crucial to carefully consider which places might be the most promising for ⿻ to spread next.  One obvious example that pervades our discussions so far is the governance of cities.  Yet precisely because we have drawn on such public sector examples so heavily thus far, we focus in this part of the book on a diversity of social sectors where ⿻ can seed reality that touches a much broader range of life than the narrow definition of public sector "democracy".  In doing so, we aim to match the scales mentioned above and cover a broad range of life experiences, while attending to areas with respect and prestige in a broad range of societies.   
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ In particular, we consider, as symbolized also in Figure C:
 
 1. Workplace, which is a highly influential sector because so much of the capitalist economy is driven by it.  Again, especially in the largest companies, finding scale matches is quite straightforward.
 2. Health, which is another sector touching almost every life, is especially relevant outside of the working years we cover in the previous chapter and perhaps the most widely respected social sector.  Many health systems, as noted above, match in scale.
-3. Media, which perhaps has the greatest capacity to spread new practices as it is close to the conceptual, communicative and ideational foundation of most societies.  Many publications and social media platforms match the relevant scale.
+3. Media, which perhaps has the greatest capacity to spread new practices as it is close to the conceptual, communicative, and ideational foundation of most societies.  Many publications and social media platforms match the relevant scale.
 4. The environment, which surrounds us all and touches us at a global scale unlike anything else, and which complements the other sectors, appealing to many who urge us to think beyond human work, health and idea exchange.
 
 We highlight each of these domains through a series of vignettes and attempt to roughly quantify how a range of ⿻ technologies could transform practice in ways that could potentially scale across or even beyond the sector.