feat(lightning): fund-safety hardening and protocol completion#92
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coreyphillips wants to merge 6 commits into
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feat(lightning): fund-safety hardening and protocol completion#92coreyphillips wants to merge 6 commits into
coreyphillips wants to merge 6 commits into
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Implement a full Lightning node on top of beignet's on-chain wallet: Noise transport, channel state machine, on-chain monitoring, gossip and routing, invoices, and onion payments, plus a CLI/HTTP daemon and AI-agent tooling. Protocol coverage: - BOLT 1/8: Noise transport, init, peer management - BOLT 2: channel open/close, HTLC lifecycle, channel reestablish - BOLT 3: key derivation, commitment & HTLC txs, anchor outputs - BOLT 4: Sphinx onion, payment forwarding, failure handling - BOLT 5: force-close, output resolution, sweeps, penalty txs - BOLT 7: gossip sync, network graph, pathfinding, mission control - BOLT 11: invoice encode/decode/sign - Extensions: dual funding (v2), splicing, zero-conf, keysend, quiescence, SCID aliases, rapid gossip sync Anchor channels are the default channel type, made force-close-safe by wallet-funded fee bumping: zero-fee second-level HTLC txs get a wallet fee input attached, and commitments are CPFP-bumped via the local anchor output. Both paths validated end-to-end against LND on regtest. Adds a CLI/HTTP daemon (OpenAPI spec, webhooks, payment queue, rate limiting) and AI-agent ergonomics (liquidity/fee advisors, structured logs, mainnet-readiness checks). Tested: 2,740 lightning + 720 CLI unit tests, plus interop suites against LND, CLN, and Eclair.
… test coverage Startup reliability (mainnet): - electrum: de-dupe concurrent connectToElectrum() calls via a shared in-flight promise, so racing startup connects no longer clobber rn-electrum-client's shared global socket and emit a spurious "Unable to connect to Electrum server." - electrum-backend: listUnspent() fails fast when disconnected instead of probing a not-yet-open socket (which logged a raw "Connection to server lost" stack trace from the client library). - beignet-node: defer fallback-fund recovery until Electrum is actually connected; clean the wait timer up on shutdown. - lightning-node: emit node:ready as soon as a channel reaches NORMAL, so waitForReady() no longer spuriously times out when a single stored peer is offline/slow to reconnect. Test coverage: - BOLT 3/4/8/11 conformance vectors and tests under tests/lightning/conformance. - HTLC-claim crypto tests and a mempool interop test for on-chain claims. - chain-resolver, htlc-safety and socks5 test additions. Accompanying channel/commitment/onion/serialization hardening across the chain, channel and transport modules.
BOLT 7 requires channel_update and node_announcement timestamps to be greater than zero but does not specify handling for violations. Reject zero-timestamp messages in decodeChannelUpdateMessage and decodeNodeAnnouncementMessage so they never reach the network graph, matching the parse-time fix LND shipped in v0.20.1-beta for the zero-timestamp gossip DoS class. Also wrap the channel_announcement/node_announcement/channel_update gossip handlers in try/catch so a malformed or rejected message is dropped silently instead of propagating up through the peer message dispatcher (which is not itself guarded). Adds regression tests for both decoders. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Apply eslint --fix to resolve the 45 pre-existing prettier/prettier errors flagged by the PR lint check. Formatting-only changes; no logic affected. `lint:check` now exits clean (0 errors, warnings only). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adversarial fund-safety fixes (loss-of-funds hardening against an untrusted peer and an on-chain adversary), each with regression tests: - Classify a revoked commitment that shares our local commitment index as a breach via script-based ownership disambiguation, so it is penalized instead of being mistaken for our own commitment and left unpunished. - Claim a received HTLC on-chain when the preimage is learned after the peer force-closes with their current commitment, preventing loss of a forwarded HTLC to the peer's timeout path. - Persist isLessor/leaseExpiry so a lessor's lease-locked commitment rebuilds byte-identically after a restart and stays broadcastable (with a serialize, restore, rebuild byte-parity invariant test). - Resolve a live, urgency-bumped force-close feerate from the fee estimator at every force-close entry point instead of a hardcoded rate. - Re-fee-bump stuck anchor second-level HTLC transactions so a post-broadcast fee spike cannot strand the HTLC race. - Reject a liquidity-ads lease unless the seller funds at least the requested amount. - Recover from reorgs: retain output watches after a spend and re-broadcast our penalty or HTLC-success if a reorg evicts it. - Enforce low-S (BIP146) on the remote commitment and HTLC signatures we place in transactions we broadcast. - Reject the invalid script-enforced-lease plus simple-taproot channel-type combination at negotiation (they are mutually exclusive commitment types). Also lands the accumulated Lightning feature work on this branch: simple taproot channels (BOLT 3/5 scripts and MuSig2 co-signing), hold invoices and async payments, dual funding with liquidity ads (bLIP-0051), BOLT 12 offers, and route blinding, with substantially expanded test coverage. Verification: full non-interop lightning suite 2916 passing, BOLT conformance 42 passing, tsc clean.
The initial anchor commitment CPFP was one-shot, so a fee spike after the force-close broadcast could pin the commitment and block every second-level HTLC claim (each spends a commitment output). ChannelManager now retains each anchor force-close CPFP and the node re-issues it at the current live feerate every few blocks, while the commitment is still unconfirmed, until it confirms. Full non-interop lightning suite 2919 passing, BOLT conformance 42 passing, tsc clean.
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Closing: this should target the coreyphillips/beignet fork, not the upstream. Re-opening there. |
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Summary
This branch adds a from-scratch, BOLT-compliant Lightning Network implementation under
src/lightning/, and this update lands a round of adversarial fund-safety hardening on top of the accumulated feature work.Fund-safety fixes
Each is a loss-of-funds hardening against an untrusted peer and an on-chain adversary, and ships with a regression test:
to_localscripts, so the breach is routed to the penalty path.isLessor/leaseExpiryare now serialized, so a lessor's lease-locked commitment rebuilds byte-identically after a restart and its cached remote signature stays valid. Covered by a serialize/restore/rebuild byte-parity invariant test.Two additional audited surfaces (cooperative-close output validation and inbound
update_feebounds) were reviewed and found already safe; no changes were required there.Feature scope on this branch
Simple taproot channels (BOLT 3/5 scripts plus MuSig2 co-signing), hold invoices and async payments, dual funding with liquidity ads (bLIP-0051), BOLT 12 offers, and route blinding.
Testing
tsc --noEmit: clean.