[core][sandbox] Support multi-uid user namespaces for network="public" sandboxes - #65823
[core][sandbox] Support multi-uid user namespaces for network="public" sandboxes#65823xyuzh wants to merge 12 commits into
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This pull request introduces an experimental REST API service for Ray Sandbox, allowing users to manage sandboxes externally via a FastAPI application on Ray Serve. It also adds support for private network namespaces bridged by pasta (passt) and multi-uid user-namespace mapping to preserve file ownership within sandboxes. The review feedback highlights two critical issues: a missing json import in image_utils.py that will cause a runtime NameError, and a potential unhandled OSError in idmap.py if subprocess.Popen fails outside of the try block.
| import subprocess | ||
| import sys |
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The json module is used in _write_ownership_sidecar (via json.dump) and ensure_idmapped_rootfs (via json.dumps), but it is not imported in this file. This will raise a NameError at runtime when these functions are executed. Please import json at the top of the file.
| import subprocess | |
| import sys | |
| import json | |
| import subprocess | |
| import sys |
| holder = subprocess.Popen( | ||
| ["unshare", "--user", "sleep", "5"], | ||
| stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, | ||
| stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, | ||
| stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, | ||
| ) | ||
| try: | ||
| wait_for_userns(holder.pid) | ||
| map_ids_into(holder.pid, candidate) | ||
| return sudo_mapfile | ||
| except (OSError, RuntimeError): | ||
| pass | ||
| finally: | ||
| holder.kill() | ||
| holder.communicate() |
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In _probe_sudo_mapfile, subprocess.Popen is called outside of the try block. If unshare is missing or fails to execute (raising an OSError), the exception will propagate unhandled and crash the detection process instead of gracefully falling back to a single-uid namespace. Moving the Popen call inside the try block and checking if holder is not None in the finally block ensures robust error handling.
| holder = subprocess.Popen( | |
| ["unshare", "--user", "sleep", "5"], | |
| stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, | |
| stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, | |
| stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, | |
| ) | |
| try: | |
| wait_for_userns(holder.pid) | |
| map_ids_into(holder.pid, candidate) | |
| return sudo_mapfile | |
| except (OSError, RuntimeError): | |
| pass | |
| finally: | |
| holder.kill() | |
| holder.communicate() | |
| holder = None | |
| try: | |
| holder = subprocess.Popen( | |
| ["unshare", "--user", "sleep", "5"], | |
| stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, | |
| stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, | |
| stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, | |
| ) | |
| wait_for_userns(holder.pid) | |
| map_ids_into(holder.pid, candidate) | |
| return sudo_mapfile | |
| except (OSError, RuntimeError): | |
| pass | |
| finally: | |
| if holder is not None: | |
| holder.kill() | |
| holder.communicate() |
Exposes ray.experimental.sandbox over a versioned REST API (/api/v1) served by Ray Serve, so sandboxes can be managed from outside the Ray cluster with nothing but an HTTP client and a bearer token — e.g. as an Anyscale service, or by agent-evaluation frameworks like Harbor. Design: - Each sandbox is a named, detached SandboxHost actor; the actors are the registry, so the Serve app is stateless and replicas can scale or restart without losing sandboxes. - Creation and execution are async submit + poll (with optional long-poll wait_seconds <= 30s) because image pulls and agent commands outlive HTTP requests and load-balancer limits. - The TTL reclaims both the sandbox and its hosting actor (the core runtime's TTL is deliberately disabled here so there is one owner). - Capabilities, network modes, DNS, shell, and workdir semantics are the core SandboxConfig's (ray-project#65570); the API validates network against VALID_NETWORK_MODES and defaults capabilities to DOCKER_DEFAULT_CAPABILITIES, patching nothing. - fastapi is only needed by this subpackage (ray[serve]); the base sandbox package never imports it. Testing: 54 unit tests run with no cluster and no runsc (fake runtime + fake actor resolver + FastAPI TestClient), including an OpenAPI contract snapshot; a runsc-gated integration test covers the real path. Validated end to end as a local 'serve run' and as an Anyscale service, driving real gVisor sandboxes. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
POST /sandboxes now synthesizes its 202 response from the request instead of awaiting describe() on the new actor: on a saturated cluster the actor may be queued behind capacity for longer than a client (or load balancer) read timeout, and the endpoint has everything it needs to answer without touching the actor. Surfaced by a Harbor concurrency test that oversubscribed a single node. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
A 16-way Terminal-Bench run against a cold cluster surfaced two capacity bugs: - The Serve deployment used the default max_ongoing_requests, but this API is long-poll based (requests deliberately hold a slot for up to ~30s), so a handful of concurrent clients saturated the replica and the platform load balancer answered 503 for everyone else. Raise it to 1000; the app is entirely async I/O. - Calls to a SandboxHost whose detached actor exists but has not been *scheduled* yet (cluster autoscaling) block indefinitely. Bound every actor call by the request's own long-poll budget plus a configurable scheduling grace: describe paths report a synthesized 'pending' instead of hanging, and exec/file paths return 409 with a retry hint. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
An actor whose cpu/memory shape can never fit the cluster raises ActorUnschedulableError from any call; the app let it escape as an opaque 500. Terminal-Bench tasks declaring cpus=4/memory_mb=8192 on a cluster of 4CPU-16GB workers hit this for every large task. Map it to 409 'unschedulable' carrying Ray's own message, so clients see exactly which resource shape cannot be satisfied. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
Proxies in front of a deployed service cap request bodies (an Anyscale ingress rejected a 4.8MB upload with 413 and killed an 11MB one mid-body), so single-request file uploads have a hidden size ceiling. PUT /files gains an append flag, plumbed through host, runtime, and backend (cat >> instead of cat >), so clients can chunk arbitrarily large uploads into proxy-sized pieces. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
Match the style established in ray-project#65627 for the networking section: soft-wrapped prose, em-dash and semicolon clauses split into separate sentences, and bold list leads. Also document the new append flag on PUT /files and the 409 unschedulable error code. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
… shared runsc cache, concurrent listing Three review findings: - A dead detached actor made its client_token permanently return 404; the idempotent-create path now clears the dead actor and creates a fresh sandbox under the same name. - The opt-in runsc download leaked a ~40MB temp dir per boot and raced concurrent boots; it now uses one shared cached path per node with an atomic rename. - GET /sandboxes described actors sequentially; it now gathers concurrently. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
runsc exec takes numeric -user uid[:gid]; names are resolved against the image's own /etc/passwd host-side. Plumbed through runtime, the HTTP API (StartExecRequest.user), and the backend, with tests. Brings exec to parity with container engines' exec --user and the Harbor environment contract's user= parameter. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
… via pasta Each public-mode sandbox now runs inside its own network namespace bridged by pasta (passt) user-mode networking: internet egress works, but ports and loopback are private — a bind on 0.0.0.0 cannot collide with the worker pod or other sandboxes, and nothing in the sandbox is reachable from outside it. This fulfills public's documented contract (egress without the host's network identity) and unblocks workloads that bind fixed ports, e.g. QEMU hostfwd tasks in Terminal-Bench. runsc still runs with --network=host; host is simply the private namespace. The mount namespace stays shared so runsc control sockets keep working. RAY_SANDBOX_PUBLIC_HOST_NETNS=1 on workers restores the previous shared-namespace behavior without a deploy; the auto_install_pasta server setting (default off) downloads a static pasta build on nodes that lack the passt package. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
…ns via pasta Each public-mode sandbox gets a private user+network namespace pair, bridged by pasta (passt) user-mode networking in the rootless-Podman topology: a holder process pins the namespaces, pasta attaches from the pod side (so its uplink is the pod's real interface) and daemonizes, and runsc enters via nsenter as mapped root. Internet egress works, but ports and loopback are private — a bind on 0.0.0.0 cannot collide with the worker pod or other sandboxes, and nothing in the sandbox is reachable from outside it. This fulfills public's documented contract (egress without the host's network identity) and unblocks workloads that bind fixed ports, e.g. QEMU hostfwd tasks in Terminal-Bench. runsc still runs with --network=host — "host" is simply the private namespace — and without --rootless: it is already root in the holder's user namespace, and a nested user namespace would put the gofer's /proc/<pid>/root magic links out of reach. Mount and pid namespaces stay shared, so the bundle and the runsc control sockets keep working for pod-side state/exec/kill/delete. The host boot path creates /dev/net/tun (absent in fresh Kubernetes pods) via passwordless sudo. RAY_SANDBOX_PUBLIC_HOST_NETNS=1 on workers restores the previous shared-namespace behavior without a deploy; the auto_install_pasta server setting (default off) downloads a static pasta build on nodes without the passt package. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
…" sandboxes Rootless-style sandboxes previously mapped the whole container to one host uid: every file read as root, chown to any other user failed with EINVAL, and ownership baked into image layers (postfix's 0700 uid-101 spool, mailman's uid-38 data) flattened away — failing workloads that spread ownership across users. network="public" sandboxes now map subordinate id ranges into their user namespace, the rootless-Podman model: the holder starts unmapped and the setuid newuidmap/newgidmap helpers write "0 <worker-id> 1" plus "1 <subbase> <count>" before pasta and runsc join as mapped root. detect_idmap() degrades to the previous single-uid mapping (warn-once) when the uidmap helpers, /etc/subuid ranges, or no_new_privs make the mapping impossible; RAY_SANDBOX_SINGLE_UID=1 forces that fallback. Image-baked ownership survives through a reworked cache: extraction records each layer's non-root owners (whiteout-aware) into an .ownership.json sidecar, the cached tar restores true uid/gid onto its members (the shared extracted rootfs stays worker-owned for single-uid sandboxes), and multi-uid sandboxes mount a per-node "<image>.idmap" rootfs variant extracted from that tar inside an ephemeral mapped user namespace — chown-before-chmod so setuid/setgid bits survive, ids outside the range skipped with a warning. The .extracted marker is versioned (ownership-v2), so legacy caches re-pull once. boot() best-effort-appends missing subordinate id entries via sudo (uidmap package install is warned about, not attempted). Traversing another user's 0700 directory as root additionally needs CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which Docker's default capability set carries and the bare runsc-spec default does not; documented in troubleshooting. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
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| euid, egid = os.geteuid(), os.getegid() | ||
| name = _user_name() | ||
| uid_range = parse_subid_file("/etc/subuid", name, euid) | ||
| gid_range = parse_subid_file("/etc/subgid", name, egid) |
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Subgid lookup uses gid not uid
Medium Severity
/etc/subgid is keyed by user name or numeric uid, same as /etc/subuid, but detect_idmap looks it up with egid. When the file is uid-keyed and the worker's uid and gid differ, the range is missed and multi-uid silently falls back to a single-uid namespace. _ensure_idmap uses the same gid key when deciding whether a subgid line already exists.
Additional Locations (1)
Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit f2f0c1b. Configure here.
…t the sandbox The netns tests boot a network="public" sandbox, whose non-rootless runsc drops the sandbox process to nobody and opens a nested user namespace. Some sandboxed CI hosts allow a single unprivileged user namespace (enough for the rootless tests) yet forbid that nested open, so the tests failed with "Couldn't open user namespace ...: Permission denied". Gate ensure_pasta on a ground-truth probe that boots and tears down a throwaway busybox sandbox, and skip when the host cannot. Signed-off-by: xyuzh <xinyzng@gmail.com>
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Cursor Bugbot has reviewed your changes using default effort and found 1 potential issue.
There are 2 total unresolved issues (including 1 from previous review).
Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit d74d0a1. Configure here.
| except SandboxError: | ||
| return False | ||
| backend.delete_sandbox(sandbox_id) | ||
| return True |
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Probe skips tests on any failure
Medium Severity
_public_netns_supported treats every SandboxError from create_sandbox as an unsupported host and ensure_pasta then skips the whole netns suite, always blaming a nested user namespace. Image-pull failures, pasta/tun errors, idmap extract problems, timeouts, and regressions in the pasta boot path all become silent skips, so a broken network="public" create no longer fails CI.
Additional Locations (1)
Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit d74d0a1. Configure here.


Description
Rootless-style sandboxes map the whole container to a single host uid: every file reads as root,
chownto any other user fails, and ownership baked into image layers flattens away. Workloads that spread ownership across users break — terminal-bench'smailmantask fails postfix's ownership integrity check (postsuper: fatal: scan_dir_push: open directory defer: Permission denied) because the image ships/var/spool/postfix/*owned by uid 101 with 0700/1730 modes, which single-uid extraction flattens to root.This PR gives
network="public"sandboxes a multi-uid user namespace, the rootless-Podman model:1..countonto the node's/etc/subuid//etc/subgidsubordinate range before pasta and runsc join. Probe-based detection (detect_idmap()) verifies a mapping can actually be written at boot — via the setuidnewuidmap/newgidmaphelpers, or via privileged direct/proc/<pid>/uid_mapwrites where a build pipeline stripped the setuid bits (shadow's helpers refuse cross-user targets, so sudo-ing them is not an option) — and degrades to the previous single-uid namespace with a warn-once when neither works (e.g.no_new_privs, or the pod itself running under a sandboxed runtime such as gVisor/GKE Sandbox whose kernel only accepts self-maps).RAY_SANDBOX_SINGLE_UID=1forces the fallback..ownership.jsonsidecar; the cached tar restores true uid/gid onto its members while the shared extracted rootfs stays worker-owned (single-uid sandboxes are unaffected); multi-uid sandboxes mount a per-node<image>.idmaprootfs variant extracted from that tar inside an ephemeral mapped user namespace — chown-before-chmod so setuid/setgid bits survive, out-of-range ids skipped with a warning. The.extractedmarker is versioned (ownership-v2) so legacy caches re-pull once.0700directory as root additionally needsCAP_DAC_OVERRIDE— present in Docker's default capability set, absent from the barerunsc specdefault; documented in troubleshooting.Node prerequisites (documented):
uidmappackage + subordinate id ranges for the worker user; runc-backed pods (an outer gVisor sandbox cannot write child uid maps).Stacked on #65633 and #65820 — review the top commit only until those merge.
Related issues
Related to #65633, #65820.
Additional information
Tested with
TEST_SANDBOX=1gated tests in a privileged dev container as a non-root user, on both mapping paths (setuid helpers intact, and stripped bits + sudo map-file writes): image-baked ownership (uid=1010700 spool dir,02710setgid dir built into a fixture image) stats correctly inside the sandbox and root traverses it; runtimechownto arbitrary uids materializes host-side at the subordinate ids on workdir binds; a mailman-shaped mini (adduser +chown -R+ setgid-directory group inheritance) passes; single-uidnetwork="none"sandboxes sharing the same image cache are unaffected; the netns isolation matrix from #65820 passes unchanged under multi-uid.