[RFC] qcom-firmware-sign: build-time secure-boot signing of Qualcomm firmware

ci/ecdsa-secure-boot-test-keys.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
+#
+# Include this kas file to enable test ECDSA PKI keys for Qualcomm
+# secure-boot image signing.  These keys are for CI / development use
+# only and must NOT be used in production images.
+#
+# Usage: kas build ci/base.yml:ci/<machine>.yml:ci/secure-boot.yml:ci/ecdsa-secure-boot-test-keys.yml
+
+header:
+  version: 14
+
+local_conf_header:
+  ecdsa-secure-boot-test-keys: |
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR = "${LAYERDIR_qcom}/ci/test-keys/ecdsa"

ci/secure-boot.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
+#
+# Include this kas file to enable Qualcomm secure-boot signing of
+# pre-built firmware images via classes-recipe/qcom-firmware-sign.bbclass.
+# Wires the build through to sectools-native and security-profiles-native
+# and supplies the fuse-binding parameters used by sectools at sign time.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   kas build ci/base.yml:ci/<machine>.yml:ci/secure-boot.yml:ci/ecdsa-secure-boot-test-keys.yml
+#
+# For production builds, replace ecdsa-secure-boot-test-keys.yml with
+# a kas overlay that sets QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR to an OEM key
+# directory (with qpsa_rootca0.cer / qpsa_attestca0.cer /
+# qpsa_attestca0.key / sha384_roots_hash.txt) sourced from a secrets
+# manager rather than the in-tree test fixtures.
+
+header:
+  version: 14
+
+# meta-oe provides libzip, which qdl-native links against (besides
+# libusb-1.0 and libxml-2.0 from oe-core).  meta-python is not pulled
+# in; we have no Python-only dependency.
+repos:
+  meta-openembedded:
+    url: https://github.com/openembedded/meta-openembedded
+    layers:
+      meta-oe:
+
+local_conf_header:
+  secure-boot: |
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ENABLE = "1"
+
+    # Per-SoC Security Profile XML.  Bare filenames are resolved
+    # against the directory staged by security-profiles-native; an
+    # absolute path can be used to point at a custom profile.
+    QCOM_SECURITY_PROFILE       ?= "kodiak_security_profile.xml"
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE = "${QCOM_SECURITY_PROFILE}"
+
+    # Fuse-binding identifiers.  These are device-specific; the values
+    # below are placeholders for development.  Override per OEM /
+    # production build.
+    QCOM_FUSE_OEM_HW_ID              = "0x0001"
+    QCOM_FUSE_OEM_PRODUCT_ID         = "0xabcd"
+    QCOM_FUSE_SEC_KEY_DERIVATION_KEY = ""
+
+    # Anti-rollback floor stamped into signed images.  Bump only when
+    # rolling forward security-critical firmware revisions.
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ANTI_ROLLBACK = "0x0"
+
+    # Enable the qcomflash-vip image type.  Produces an additional
+    # ${IMAGE_NAME}.qcomflash-vip.tar.gz next to the qcomflash tarball
+    # containing the signed VIP (Validated Image Programming) digest
+    # table -- intended to be flashed alongside qcomflash via
+    # `qdl --vip-table-path`.  See classes-recipe/image_types_qcom_vip.bbclass
+    # and recipes-devtools/qdl/qdl-native_2.7.bb.
+    IMAGE_CLASSES += "image_types_qcom_vip"
+    IMAGE_FSTYPES += "qcomflash-vip"

ci/test-keys/ecdsa/qpsa_attestca0.key

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS-----
+BgUrgQQAIg==
+-----END EC PARAMETERS-----
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGkAgEBBDD0kj7dDRzPghNxNjknJC68swgJH/XGdBVinbVPoWjlEV95Ipr3y6E4
+RNF7IU3lT2KgBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAASnFtGeU9cEUA3+kBdiUyP7wDL4HUTgzZoo
+KBS+aGWZ0F04+lcPxpKfxGXv3LGJ1Ucbusc2TsijfPsuWoP9YhRnb0bdpvsarUDG
+mCuFPv9+lABY30VuKyfVMR0iNGQhQlY=
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

ci/test-keys/ecdsa/sha384_roots_hash.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA2-384(qpsa_rootca0.cer)= 9bc289bd255ec63e5752d15c15fa64d2f1ec0dd78e0438e5ffea498ae16d0aada49491eadaefe782fe3f91d147a540d3

classes-recipe/qcom-firmware-sign.bbclass

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved.
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause-Clear
+#
+
+QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ENABLE ??= "0"
+
+# Sectools binary -- defaults to the one staged by sectools-native.
+QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECTOOLS ?= "${STAGING_BINDIR_NATIVE}/sectools"
+
+QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE      ?= ""
+QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE_DIR  ?= "${STAGING_DATADIR_NATIVE}/qcom-security-profiles"
+
+# Directory containing the OEM signing material:
+#   qpsa_rootca0.cer        -- root certificate
+#   qpsa_attestca0.cer      -- attestation CA certificate
+#   qpsa_attestca0.key      -- attestation CA private key
+#   sha384_roots_hash.txt   -- root hash for verification
+# Tests use ci/test-keys/ecdsa via ci/ecdsa-secure-boot-test-keys.yml.
+QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR ?= ""
+
+# Fuse identifiers, passed through to consumers / signing wrappers.
+QCOM_FUSE_OEM_HW_ID                  ?= ""
+QCOM_FUSE_OEM_PRODUCT_ID             ?= ""
+QCOM_FUSE_SEC_KEY_DERIVATION_KEY     ?= ""
+
+# Anti-rollback version embedded in the signed images.
+QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ANTI_ROLLBACK     ?= "0x0"
+
+# Pull in the build-host signing helpers only when signing is enabled.
+DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ENABLE', '1', \
+            'sectools-native security-profiles-native', '', d)}"
+
+# Mapping from common firmware filenames to sectools image-id labels.
+QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_IMAGE_ID_MAP ??= "\
+    a660_zap.mbn:GPU-MICRO-CODE \
+    adsp.mbn:ADSP \
+    aop.mbn:AOP \
+    cdsp.mbn:CDSP \
+    cpucp.elf:CPUCP \
+    devcfg.mbn:TZ-DEVCFG \
+    hypvm.mbn:QHEE \
+    imagefv.elf:UEFIFV \
+    ipa_fws.mbn:IPA-FW \
+    loadalgota64.mbn:TZ-APP-OEM \
+    msbtfw11.mbn:SKIP \
+    multi_image.mbn:OEM-MISC \
+    prog_firehose_ddr.elf:DEVICE-PROGRAMMER \
+    prog_firehose_lite.elf:DEVICE-PROGRAMMER \
+    qupv3fw.elf:QUPV3 \
+    sec.elf:SEC-ELF \
+    shrm.elf:SHRM \
+    tz.mbn:TZ \
+    uefi.elf:UEFI \
+    uefi_sec.mbn:TZ-APP-OEM \
+    vpu20_1v.mbn:VENUS-FW \
+    vpu30_4v.mbn:VENUS-FW \
+    vpu30_4v_16mb.mbn:VENUS-FW \
+    wpss.mbn:WPSS \
+    xbl_config.elf:XBL-CONFIG \
+    xbl_config_gunyah.elf:XBL-CONFIG \
+    xbl_config_kvm.elf:XBL-CONFIG \
+    xbl.elf:XBL \
+    XblRamdump.elf:XBL-RAM-DUMP \
+    DigestsToSign.bin.mbn:VIP \
+    FD02C9DA-306C-48C7-A49C-BBD827AE86EE.mbn:TZ-APP-OEM \
+"
+
+# Internal helper: print the absolute path of the security profile XML
+# (resolving QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE bare filenames against
+# QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE_DIR), or fail with bbfatal.
+qcom_sign_resolve_secprofile() {
+    profile="${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE}"
+    if [ -z "${profile}" ]; then
+        bbfatal "QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE is empty -- set it to a profile filename (e.g. kodiak_security_profile.xml) or to an absolute path."
+    fi
+    case "${profile}" in
+        /*) printf '%s\n' "${profile}" ;;
+        *)  printf '%s/%s\n' "${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE_DIR}" "${profile}" ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+# Verifies that everything the signing step needs exists before the
+# task actually runs -- avoids cryptic sectools errors deep in the
+# signing pipeline.
+qcom_check_signing_enabled() {
+    if [ "${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ENABLE}" != "1" ]; then
+        return 1
+    fi
+    if [ ! -x "${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECTOOLS}" ]; then
+        bbfatal "QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECTOOLS ('${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECTOOLS}') is missing or not executable."
+    fi
+    secprofile="$(qcom_sign_resolve_secprofile)"
+    if [ ! -f "${secprofile}" ]; then
+        bbfatal "Security profile not found: ${secprofile}"
+    fi
+    if [ ! -d "${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR}" ]; then
+        bbfatal "QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR ('${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR}') is not a directory."
+    fi
+    for f in qpsa_rootca0.cer qpsa_attestca0.cer qpsa_attestca0.key sha384_roots_hash.txt; do
+        if [ ! -f "${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR}/${f}" ]; then
+            bbfatal "Required key file missing: ${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR}/${f}"
+        fi
+    done
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Look up the sectools image-id for a given firmware filename in
+# QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_IMAGE_ID_MAP.  Prints the id (or "SKIP" / "")
+# to stdout; never fails.
+qcom_sign_lookup_image_id() {
+    basename="$1"
+    for entry in ${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_IMAGE_ID_MAP}; do
+        case "${entry}" in
+            "${basename}:"*) printf '%s\n' "${entry#*:}"; return 0 ;;
+        esac
+    done
+    printf '\n'
+}
+
+# Sign a single file in place.  $1 is the absolute path; any non-zero
+# sectools exit triggers a bbfatal in the caller.  The primary signal
+# for "is this file signable" is the filename->image-id map -- the
+# upstream Qualcomm reference binaries (qcm6490_bootbinaries.1.0-
+# test-device-public et al.) arrive WITHOUT a pre-existing signature,
+# so checking `--inspect` for a Software ID skips everything.
+qcom_sign_only_file() {
+    file_path="$1"
+    file_name="$(basename "${file_path}")"
+    secprofile="$(qcom_sign_resolve_secprofile)"
+
+    image_id="$(qcom_sign_lookup_image_id "${file_name}")"
+    if [ -z "${image_id}" ]; then
+        bbdebug 1 "${file_name}: not in image-id map, skipping"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    case "${image_id}" in
+        SKIP|SKIP:*)
+            bbnote "${file_name}: skipping (mapped to ${image_id})"
+            return 0
+            ;;
+    esac
+
+    # Validate the image-id against the active security profile.  Each
+    # profile only declares a subset of the global image-id namespace,
+    # so skip-with-warn rather than fail for out-of-scope ids.
+    #
+    # sectools v1.48 prints the list as a numbered enumeration, e.g.
+    #     Available Image IDs:
+    #     1. ABL
+    #     2. ACPI
+    #     ...
+    #     44. XBL
+    #     45. XBL-CONFIG
+    if ! "${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECTOOLS}" secure-image --available-image-ids \
+            --security-profile "${secprofile}" 2>/dev/null \
+            | sed -nE 's/^[[:space:]]*[0-9]+\.[[:space:]]*([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)[[:space:]]*$/\1/p' \
+            | grep -Fqx "${image_id}"; then
+        bbwarn "${file_name}: image-id '${image_id}' is not valid for the active security profile, skipping"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    bbnote "sectools sign ${file_name} as ${image_id}"
+    pre_sha="$(sha256sum "${file_path}" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
+    "${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECTOOLS}" secure-image \
+        --sign "${file_path}" \
+        --image-id="${image_id}" \
+        --security-profile "${secprofile}" \
+        --anti-rollback-version="${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ANTI_ROLLBACK}" \
+        --signing-mode LOCAL \
+        --root-certificate-index 0 \
+        --root-certificate="${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR}/qpsa_rootca0.cer" \
+        --ca-certificate="${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR}/qpsa_attestca0.cer" \
+        --ca-key="${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR}/qpsa_attestca0.key" \
+        --outfile "${file_path}" \
+        || bbfatal "Signing ${file_name} failed"
+
+    # sectools' --sign returns 0 for non-fatal "I don't know how to sign
+    # this" cases (e.g. plain ELF passed in for an image-id whose profile
+    # entry expects MBN-V6) and produces a byte-identical output instead
+    # of erroring out.  Detect that explicitly so silent no-ops surface as
+    # warnings instead of being caught downstream by a confusing
+    # verify-root failure.
+    post_sha="$(sha256sum "${file_path}" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
+    if [ "${pre_sha}" = "${post_sha}" ]; then
+        bbwarn "${file_name}: sectools --sign left the file byte-identical when signing as '${image_id}' -- the input does not appear to be in the format that image-id expects.  Mark this entry as 'SKIP:<reason>' in QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_IMAGE_ID_MAP if this is intentional."
+    fi
+}
+
+# Sign + verify-root in one step.  Use this for files where the active
+# security profile permits OEM-only signatures (i.e. does NOT have
+# <oem_vouch_for_disallowed/> on the image entry).  For files where the
+# profile requires hybrid OEM+QTI vouching (e.g. VIP under the upstream
+# github security-profiles repo), call qcom_sign_only_file() instead --
+# sectools' verify-root rejects OEM-only signatures against those
+# profile entries even though the boot ROM accepts them.
+qcom_sign_verify_file() {
+    file_path="$1"
+    file_name="$(basename "${file_path}")"
+
+    pre_sha="$(sha256sum "${file_path}" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
+    qcom_sign_only_file "$1" || return $?
+    post_sha="$(sha256sum "${file_path}" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
+
+    # If sign was a no-op (file not in map, mapped to SKIP, image-id
+    # rejected by the profile, or sectools silently refused -- the warn
+    # case in qcom_sign_only_file) there is nothing to verify.  Skipping
+    # the verify-root is correct: running it against unchanged bytes
+    # would fail with a confusing "infile is not signed by OEM" error.
+    if [ "${pre_sha}" = "${post_sha}" ]; then
+        bbdebug 1 "${file_name}: unchanged after sign attempt, skipping verify-root"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    root_hash="0x$(cut -d' ' -f2 "${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR}/sha384_roots_hash.txt")"
+    "${QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECTOOLS}" secure-image --verify-root "${root_hash}" "${file_path}" \
+        || bbfatal "Root hash verification of ${file_name} failed"
+}
+
+# Default do_qcom_firmware_sign: walks ${B}/firmware-to-sign and signs
+# every *.mbn / *.elf in it.  Consumers normally override this to point
+# at the actual directory holding their images (e.g. ${D}/ for recipes
+# using firmware_install, or ${S}/ for archive-unpacked recipes).
+do_qcom_firmware_sign() {
+    if ! qcom_check_signing_enabled ; then
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    sign_root="${B}/firmware-to-sign"
+    if [ ! -d "${sign_root}" ]; then
+        bbnote "qcom-firmware-sign: ${sign_root} does not exist, nothing to do."
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    bbnote "qcom-firmware-sign: signing MBN/ELF under ${sign_root}"
+    find "${sign_root}" -type f \( -iname '*.mbn' -o -iname '*.elf' \) | while read -r f; do
+        qcom_sign_verify_file "${f}" || bbfatal "Failed to sign: ${f}"
+    done
+}
+
+do_qcom_firmware_sign[vardeps] += "\
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ENABLE \
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_KEY_DIR \
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE \
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_SECPROFILE_DIR \
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ANTI_ROLLBACK \
+    QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_IMAGE_ID_MAP \
+    QCOM_FUSE_OEM_HW_ID \
+    QCOM_FUSE_OEM_PRODUCT_ID \
+    QCOM_FUSE_SEC_KEY_DERIVATION_KEY \
+"
+
+# Run before do_deploy (for recipes that ship signed blobs via DEPLOYDIR,
+# e.g. firmware-qcom-boot-common.inc) and before do_package (for recipes
+# that ship via package_install into /lib/firmware, e.g.
+# firmware-qcom.inc / firmware-qcom-hlosfw style consumers)
+addtask qcom_firmware_sign before do_deploy before do_package after do_install

recipes-bsp/firmware-boot/firmware-qcom-boot-common.inc

@@ -27,4 +27,21 @@ do_deploy() {
 }
 addtask deploy before do_build after do_install
 
+# Optional secure-boot signing of pre-built MBN/ELF/MELF images.
+# When QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ENABLE is "0" (default) this is a no-op
+inherit qcom-firmware-sign
+
+do_qcom_firmware_sign() {
+    if ! qcom_check_signing_enabled ; then
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    bbnote "qcom-firmware-sign: walking ${S} for MBN/ELF/MELF blobs"
+    find "${S}" -maxdepth 1 -type f \
+        \( -iname '*.mbn' -o -iname '*.elf' -o -iname '*.melf' \) \
+        | while read -r f; do
+            qcom_sign_verify_file "${f}" || bbfatal "Failed to sign: ${f}"
+        done
+}
+
 inherit allarch

recipes-bsp/firmware/firmware-qcom.inc

@@ -68,6 +68,23 @@ do_install:append() {
     done
 }
 
+# Optional secure-boot signing of pre-built MBN/ELF blobs.  When
+# QCOM_FIRMWARE_SIGN_ENABLE is "0" (the default) this is a no-op
+inherit qcom-firmware-sign
+
+do_qcom_firmware_sign() {
+    if ! qcom_check_signing_enabled ; then
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    bbnote "qcom-firmware-sign: walking ${D}${FW_QCOM_BASE_PATH} for MBN/ELF blobs"
+    find "${D}${FW_QCOM_BASE_PATH}" -type f \
+        \( -iname '*.mbn' -o -iname '*.elf' \) \
+        | while read -r f; do
+            qcom_sign_verify_file "${f}" || bbfatal "Failed to sign: ${f}"
+        done
+}
+
 INHIBIT_PACKAGE_DEBUG_SPLIT = "1"
 INHIBIT_PACKAGE_STRIP = "1"
 INHIBIT_DEFAULT_DEPS = "1"