Security: Unsafe forwarding of inbound SSR headers to upstream API#624
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tuanaiseo wants to merge 1 commit intonuxt-community:mainfrom
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When `proxyHeaders` is enabled (default), the plugin copies almost all incoming request headers from `ctx.req.headers` into outbound Axios headers. This includes sensitive and trust-bearing headers such as `cookie`, `authorization`, `x-forwarded-for`, and `x-real-ip` unless explicitly ignored. If the upstream API is less trusted, misconfigured, or attacker-influenced via deployment config, this can leak credentials and enable header spoofing against backend auth/rate-limit logic. Affected files: plugin.js Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com>
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Problem
When
proxyHeadersis enabled (default), the plugin copies almost all incoming request headers fromctx.req.headersinto outbound Axios headers. This includes sensitive and trust-bearing headers such ascookie,authorization,x-forwarded-for, andx-real-ipunless explicitly ignored. If the upstream API is less trusted, misconfigured, or attacker-influenced via deployment config, this can leak credentials and enable header spoofing against backend auth/rate-limit logic.Severity:
highFile:
lib/plugin.jsSolution
Use an allowlist instead of pass-through by default (for example only
accept,content-type, and explicitly required app headers). Addcookie,authorization,x-forwarded-for,x-real-ip, and similar headers to deny-by-default behavior unless explicitly opted in.Changes
lib/plugin.js(modified)Testing