fix: guard legacy redirect routes against open-redirect (B8 / J11) - #70
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The legacy /webhooks/* and /cron/* compatibility routes interpolate a user-controlled value (name/target_job/target_webhook) straight into a 301 redirect path. A value like //evil.com or /\evil.com makes the result protocol-relative, so the browser resolves it off-site (open redirect / phishing; CodeQL py/url-redirection). Add bin/url_safety.safe_path_segment (no third-party imports, no cycle risk) that strips slashes/backslashes from single-segment names, and apply it to all five app.py interpolated redirects. The template_view /workflows/<path:rest> catch-all guards against backslash/'//'/scheme tails, falling back to the catalog. Tests cover off-site payloads per route plus the normal-value happy paths.
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Closes bug B8 (CodeQL
py/url-redirection/ open redirect), part of the J11 CodeQL work.The issue
The legacy
/webhooks/*and/cron/*compatibility routes build a 301 redirect by interpolating a user-controlled value (name/target_job/target_webhook) straight into the path:redirect(f"/automations/jamfpro/{name}/edit"). A value like//evil.comor/\evil.commakes the result protocol-relative, so the browser resolves it off-site — an open redirect / phishing vector.The fix
bin/url_safety.py→safe_path_segment(value): strips/and\from a single path-segment value (no third-party imports, no cycle risk).app.pyinterpolated redirects sanitize their segment; an empty/all-separator value redirects to the automation list page rather than building a dangling//path.views/template_view.py's/workflows/<path:rest>catch-all guards against backslash //// scheme tails, falling back to the catalog.tests/test_redirect_safety.py: off-site payloads (//evil.com,/\evil.com,\\evil.com,https://evil.com,////,/) per route assert theLocationis always a local/automations(or/templates) path — never protocol-relative or off-site — plus normal-value happy-path tests. (Verified the tests have teeth: reverting a site to raw fails them.)J11 scope note
This is the concrete code fix. The remaining J11 work — dispositioning the CodeQL alert queue (the critical SSRF is accepted-by-design; ~19 alerts live in files develop already deleted and auto-resolve at release; give develop a scan baseline) — is deferred to the
develop → mainrelease PR, when the true post-merge alert set is visible.Targets
developfor the batched v3.2 release. Full suite green (145 passed), ruff clean.