feat(sdjwt): resolve the issuer key from kid via issuer metadata or DID - #290
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JWK member names and 'kty' values were repeated as string literals across the resolvers and PresentationVerifier - 'OKP' alone appeared four times. Collect the RFC 7517 vocabulary in JwkParams. Signed-off-by: abhip2565 <paul.apaul.abhishek.ap@gmail.com>
Every URL fetched comes from credential content that has not been verified yet, yet requests were unbounded, followed redirects including downgrades to plaintext, and connected to any resolved address. Route them through one client with timeouts, a response size cap, no redirects and non-public addresses refused. draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-10 10.1 requires the time and size bounds. Redirects and address restriction are configurable via NetworkPolicy. Signed-off-by: abhip2565 <paul.apaul.abhishek.ap@gmail.com>
Selection used firstOrNull on 'kid', so a duplicate silently resolved the first match and nothing checked the key was published for signature verification. Require an unambiguous match plus use, key_ops and algorithm suitability; an unlabelled key stays a candidate since RFC 7515 4.1.4 makes 'kid' a hint. Duplicate 'kid' and non-verification keys are now rejected on the CwtVerifier path too. Signed-off-by: abhip2565 <paul.apaul.abhishek.ap@gmail.com>
Only x5c was accepted, so any credential whose issuer publishes its keys as a JWK Set was rejected. Select the mechanism from 'iss' as draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-10 3.5 requires: an HTTPS 'iss' resolves through JWT VC Issuer Metadata, a DID through DID resolution, and x5c still wins when present. A DID in 'kid' is never dereferenced when 'iss' is HTTPS, since 10.2 forbids letting a credential choose the mechanism. DID resolution is an ecosystem addition 3.5 permits, not part of the draft; a trusted issuer policy is still missing and a TODO records it. Fixtures are real credentials and metadata from live issuers, replayed through a mock. Signed-off-by: abhip2565 <paul.apaul.abhishek.ap@gmail.com>
The SD-JWT rows claimed JWT VC Issuer Metadata was unsupported. Record how the mechanism is chosen, that DID resolution is an ecosystem addition rather than part of the draft, and how NetworkPolicy relaxes the network restrictions. Signed-off-by: abhip2565 <paul.apaul.abhishek.ap@gmail.com>
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. WalkthroughThe verifier now supports SD-JWT issuer keys from ChangesSD-JWT verification and key resolution
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The current change is merge-ready after normal checks and review; no actionable merge-blocking risk remains. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant SdJwtVerifier
participant SdJwtVcIssuerMetadataResolver
participant NetworkManagerClient
participant JwksKeySelector
SdJwtVerifier->>SdJwtVcIssuerMetadataResolver: Resolve issuer key from iss, kid, and alg
SdJwtVcIssuerMetadataResolver->>NetworkManagerClient: Fetch issuer metadata or jwks_uri
NetworkManagerClient-->>SdJwtVcIssuerMetadataResolver: Return bounded HTTPS response
SdJwtVcIssuerMetadataResolver->>JwksKeySelector: Select validated JWK
JwksKeySelector-->>SdJwtVerifier: Return PublicKey
Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Inline comments:
In
`@vc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/credentialverifier/statusChecker/LdpStatusChecker.kt`:
- Around line 142-146: Update decodeEncodedList and decompressGzip to enforce a
maximum decompressed status-list size while reading from GZIPInputStream,
aborting when the limit is exceeded. Add a test using a small compressed payload
whose decompressed content exceeds the configured limit, and verify it is
rejected without unbounded allocation.
In
`@vc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/keyResolver/types/jwks/JwksKeySelector.kt`:
- Around line 101-104: Update validateVerificationKey to reject malformed JWK
key_ops values: require key_ops to be an array, require every array entry to be
a string, and require it to include JwkParams.KEY_OP_VERIFY; return the existing
validation error for invalid values. Add regression tests covering a scalar
key_ops value and an array containing mixed-type entries.
In
`@vc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/networkManager/NetworkManagerClient.kt`:
- Around line 36-44: Update sendHTTPRequest to use a client configured with
Proxy.NO_PROXY whenever NetworkPolicy.restrictToPublicHosts is enabled, while
preserving the default proxy routing otherwise; add a loopback regression test
using a local ProxySelector to verify restricted requests cannot bypass host
validation through a proxy.
In
`@vc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/sdJwtVcWithDidKeyIssuer.txt`:
- Line 1: Replace the signed SD-JWT fixtures with complete re-signed credentials
using fixed timestamps in the past: update iat in sdJwtVcWithDidKeyIssuer.txt
and sdJwtVcWithX5cMultipleSans.txt, and update both iat and nbf in
sdJwtVcResolvableByX5cAndKid.txt. Preserve each fixture’s claims and signatures
after reissuing.
Apply the same fix in
`@vc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/sdJwtVcWithX5cSanMatchingIss.txt`
at line 1: Affected by future-dated iat values.
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README.mddoc/sdjwt-vc-verification-support.mdvc-verifier/kotlin/README.mdvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/PresentationVerifier.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/constants/JwkParams.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/credentialverifier/statusChecker/LdpStatusChecker.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/credentialverifier/verifier/SdJwtVerifier.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/keyResolver/Utils.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/keyResolver/types/jwks/JwksKeySelector.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/keyResolver/types/jwks/JwksPublicKeyResolver.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/keyResolver/types/jwks/SdJwtVcIssuerMetadataResolver.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/main/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/networkManager/NetworkManagerClient.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/CredentialsVerifierTest.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/credentialverifier/statusChecker/StatusListRevocationCheckerTest.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/credentialverifier/verifier/SdJwtVerifierTest.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/keyResolver/types/jwks/JwksPublicKeyResolverTest.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/keyResolver/types/jwks/SdJwtVcIssuerMetadataResolverTest.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/networkManager/NetworkManagerClientTest.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/java/io/mosip/vercred/vcverifier/networkManager/PublicAddressTest.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/java/testutils/TestUtils.ktvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/issuer_metadata/jwksReferencedByJwksUri.jsonvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/issuer_metadata/metadataMatchingCredentialX5c.jsonvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/issuer_metadata/metadataWithInlineJwks.jsonvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/issuer_metadata/metadataWithJwksUri.jsonvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/sdJwtVcResolvableByX5cAndKid.txtvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/sdJwtVcWithDidKeyIssuer.txtvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/sdJwtVcWithX5cMultipleSans.txtvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/sdJwtVcWithX5cNoSan.txtvc-verifier/kotlin/vcverifier/src/test/resources/sd-jwt_vc/sdJwtVcWithX5cSanMatchingIss.txt
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1.5 ships Java 11 bytecode (class file major 55), which older Android toolchains cannot consume. 1.6 onward targets Java 8 (major 52). The Disclosure and SDJWT APIs this library uses are byte-identical across the bump. Signed-off-by: abhip2565 <paul.apaul.abhishek.ap@gmail.com>
Bound the decompressed status list. The response cap limits the compressed payload only, and a status list is a sparse bitstring that deflates enormously, so a compliant-looking response could still exhaust the heap. Reject malformed 'key_ops'. A scalar such as "encrypt" failed the cast to List and was treated as absent, skipping the verify check entirely and admitting the key. Bypass any system proxy while the address guard is enabled. Through an HTTP proxy only the proxy host is resolved by our Dns, so a public proxy could forward a private origin and the guard would never see it. Signed-off-by: abhip2565 <paul.apaul.abhishek.ap@gmail.com>
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What
SdJwtVerifierpreviously only supported issuer keys fromx5c, so SD-JWT VCs using a published JWK Set were rejected.This PR adds the second Issuer Signature Mechanism from
draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-10§3.5.Key resolution is now based on the
issclaim:iss→ resolve JWT VC Issuer Metadata from/.well-known/jwt-vc-issuerand require metadataissuer == ississ→ resolve through DID, withkidrequired to be controlled by that DIDx5c→ continues to take precedence when presentA DID in
kidis not dereferenced whenissis HTTPS, preventing the credential from choosing its own resolution mechanism (§10.2).Other changes
Hardened JWKS key selection:
kidmatchesuse,key_ops, and algorithm suitabilityCwtVerifierviaPublicKeyResolverFactoryBounded all credential-controlled network requests with timeouts, response-size limits, redirect blocking, and non-public IP protection. Defaults can be relaxed through
NetworkPolicy.Centralized JWK member names in
JwkParams.Bumped
com.authlete:sd-jwt1.5 → 1.9. 1.5 ships Java 11 bytecode (class file major 55), which older Android toolchains cannot consume; 1.6 onward targets Java 8 (major 52). TheDisclosureandSDJWTAPIs we use are byte-identical across the bump.Out of Scope
Not addressed in this PR:
x5cchain validation, SAN-to-issbinding, and certificate expiry validation (pre -existing) @swatigoel - we might need to harden this as well.Summary by CodeRabbit
kid-based key selection with algorithm, key type, and usage validation.