ntlmssp

A pure-Rust, no-FFI implementation of Windows NTLM / NTLMSSP (MS-NLMP): the NEGOTIATE / CHALLENGE / AUTHENTICATE token exchange with NTLMv2, the message-integrity code (MIC), key exchange, and RC4 sign+seal for message privacy. No windows crate, no SSPI — so you can perform NTLM authentication from Linux/macOS to drive SMB, HTTP, or DCE/RPC.

Features

• Build the three NTLMSSP messages (Type 1/2/3) with NTLMv2, target-info, and the MIC.
• Authenticate from a password or directly from an NT hash (pass-the-hash).
• SealState: RC4-based per-message sign+seal (the sealed-RPC / packet-privacy primitive), with directional keys derived from the exported session key.
• Parse a server CHALLENGE (Type 2) into its fields (server challenge, target info).
• Crypto building blocks: md4, nt_owf_v2, and a NetNTLMv2 extractor (netntlmv2_from_type3) that yields a hashcat -m 5600 string from a captured Type 3.
• Verified against the MS-NLMP §4.2.4 NTLMv2 test vector.

Example

use ntlmssp::Ntlm;

let mut ntlm = Ntlm::new();
let type1 = ntlm.negotiate();                    // → send to server
// ... receive the server's Type 2 CHALLENGE bytes ...
let (type3, session_key) =
    ntlm.authenticate(&challenge, "CORP", "alice", "P@ssw0rd", "FILESERVER")?;
// send `type3`; use `session_key` for SMB/RPC signing.

Pass-the-hash:

let (type3, session_key) =
    ntlm.authenticate_hash(&challenge, "CORP", "alice", &nt_hash, "FILESERVER")?;

Scope

Client-side NTLMSSP (NTLMv2) + the sign/seal state machine, plus enough server-side helpers (build_challenge, netntlmv2_from_type3) to stand up a capture/relay endpoint. NTLMv1 and LM responses are intentionally not produced (NTLMv2 only).

License

MIT © icedracon. Extracted from ADhammer.