Trust-aware Nostr MCP for AI and humans. 258 tools across 29 groups. Model-agnostic. Works with Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, or any MCP client.
Install globally or run via npx:
npm install -g nostr-brayNew to Nostr? Mint a key first -- this works before anything is configured and prints your npub plus a 24-word mnemonic (write it down; it is the key):
npx nostr-bray createAdd to your MCP client config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"nostr": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["nostr-bray"],
"env": {
"NOSTR_SECRET_KEY": "nsec1...",
"NOSTR_RELAYS": "wss://relay.damus.io,wss://nos.lol"
}
}
}
}Then ask your AI to call whoami to verify it works.
For production use, prefer Heartwood or any NIP-46 bunker (your key never leaves your signing device):
{
"mcpServers": {
"nostr": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["nostr-bray"],
"env": {
"BUNKER_URI": "bunker://...",
"NOSTR_RELAYS": "wss://relay.damus.io,wss://nos.lol"
}
}
}
}| Tier | Method | Key exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Heartwood | Dedicated signing appliance (BUNKER_URI) |
Key never leaves the signing device. Supports nsec-tree derivation, per-client permissions, and device-backed attestations. |
| Software bunker | Any NIP-46 bunker (BUNKER_URI) |
Key held by a separate process. Never seen by bray. |
| ncryptsec | NIP-49 encrypted key (NOSTR_NCRYPTSEC) |
Key encrypted at rest, decrypted in memory at startup. |
| Key file | File path (NOSTR_SECRET_KEY_FILE) |
Key on disk, read once, env var deleted. |
| Env var | Inline secret (NOSTR_SECRET_KEY) |
Key visible in process environment. Use only for development. |
| Group | Tools | Key examples |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | 16 | whoami, identity-derive-persona, identity-switch, identity-prove, nip05-lookup |
| Social | 15 | social-post, social-reply, social-feed, contacts-follow, social-notifications |
| Direct Messages | 4 | dm-send, dm-read, dm-conversation |
| Trust | 22 | trust-attest, trust-ring-prove, trust-spoken-challenge, trust-attest-chain |
| Dispatch | 13 | dispatch-send, dispatch-check, dispatch-reply, dispatch-capability-discover |
| Relay | 13 | relay-query, relay-set, relay-discover, cast-spell, relay-health |
| Moderation | 16 | label-create, list-mute, list-bookmark, list-followset-create, moderation-filter |
| Marketplace | 16 | marketplace-discover, marketplace-call, listing-create, listing-search |
| Safety | 14 | canary-session-create, canary-group-create, canary-duress-signal, safety-activate |
| Blossom | 10 | blossom-upload, blossom-mirror, blossom-verify, blossom-repair |
| Privacy | 10 | privacy-commit, privacy-prove-range, privacy-prove-age, privacy-publish-proof |
| Zap | 9 | zap-send, zap-balance, zap-make-invoice, zap-decode |
| Wallet service | 5 | wallet-grant, wallet-grants, wallet-revoke, wallet-refill, wallet-serve |
| Vault | 9 | vault-create, vault-encrypt, vault-share, vault-rotate |
| Workflow | 7 | trust-score, verify-person, identity-setup, relay-health, feed-discover |
| Signet | 7 | signet-badge, signet-vouch, signet-credentials, signet-challenge |
| Communities | 5 | community-create, community-feed, community-post, community-approve |
| Badges | 4 | badge-create, badge-award, badge-accept, badge-list |
| Groups (NIP-29) | 20 | group-inspect, group-invite-create, group-forum-comment, group-delete |
| Articles | 3 | article-publish, article-read, article-list |
| Calendar | 3 | calendar-create, calendar-read, calendar-rsvp |
| Wiki | 3 | wiki-publish, wiki-read, wiki-list |
| Search | 3 | search-notes, search-profiles, hashtag-feed |
| Scheduling | 4 | post-schedule, post-queue-list, post-queue-cancel, publish-event |
| Community NIPs | 2 | nip-publish, nip-read |
| Utility | 20 | decode, validate-event, verify-event, nip44-encrypt, tombstone |
| Sync (NIP-77) | 1 | sync-plan (pull/push are explicit CLI and SDK operations) |
| Handler | 2 | handler-publish, handler-discover |
| Catalog | 2 | search-actions, execute-action |
Use search-actions to find tools by keyword, then execute-action to run them.
Protocol foundations: semantic event validation, NIP-77 reconciliation, and relay-scoped NIP-29 groups.
Dispatch lets AI agents collaborate over encrypted Nostr DMs. Any MCP-capable client can send structured tasks to other agents and receive results back.
13 message types: send, check, reply, ack, status, cancel, refuse, failure, query, propose, capability-publish, capability-discover, capability-read.
NIP-89 capability discovery: Agents publish what they can do. Other agents discover capabilities by topic, then route tasks to the right collaborator automatically.
dispatch-send("alice", "think", "Analyse the trade-offs of NIP-44 vs NIP-04")
dispatch-check() → inbox with pending tasks
dispatch-reply(taskId, result) → send results back encrypted
All messages are NIP-44 encrypted. Recipients are resolved by name, NIP-05, npub, or hex.
Every tool that accepts a recipient uses universal identity resolution. You never need to look up hex pubkeys manually.
Accepted formats:
- Name --
"alice"(resolved from your dispatch contacts) - NIP-05 --
"alice@example.com"(HTTP lookup) - npub --
"npub1abc..."(NIP-19 decode) - Hex --
"a1b2c3..."(64-character passthrough)
Sign events now, publish later. Events are signed immediately with your current key, then held in a queue until the scheduled time.
post-schedule("Good morning!", "2026-04-01T08:00:00Z")
post-queue-list() → view pending scheduled posts
post-queue-cancel(id) → cancel before it publishes
nostr-bray implements or integrates the following NIPs:
| NIP | What |
|---|---|
| NIP-01 | Events, signing, relay protocol |
| NIP-02 | Follow lists |
| NIP-05 | DNS identity (lookup, verify, relay hints) |
| NIP-09 | Event deletion |
| NIP-11 | Relay information |
| NIP-17 | Private DMs (gift wrap, default) |
| NIP-19 | bech32 encoding (npub, nsec, nprofile, nevent, naddr) |
| NIP-23 | Long-form articles (kind 30023) |
| NIP-22 | Schema-correct comments for group forums |
| NIP-29 | Relay-scoped groups, chat, forums, invitations and administration |
| NIP-32 | Labels |
| NIP-40 | Expiration tags |
| NIP-42 | Relay auth |
| NIP-44 | Encrypted payloads v2 |
| NIP-45 | Event counts |
| NIP-46 | Nostr Connect (bunker) |
| NIP-49 | Private key encryption (ncryptsec) |
| NIP-50 | Search |
| NIP-51 | Lists (mute, pin, follow sets, bookmarks) |
| NIP-52 | Calendar events |
| NIP-54 | Wiki pages |
| NIP-57 | Lightning zaps |
| NIP-58 | Badges |
| NIP-65 | Relay list metadata |
| NIP-72 | Communities |
| NIP-77 | Negentropy ID reconciliation with truthful REQ fallback |
| NIP-78 | Application-specific data |
| NIP-85 | Trust rankings |
| NIP-89 | Recommended applications (dispatch capability discovery) |
| NIP-96 | HTTP file storage (Blossom) |
| NIP-99 | Classified listings |
| NIP-A7 | Spells (kind 777 — cast saved queries) |
| NIP-VA | Verifiable attestations (kind 31000) |
Create ~/.config/bray/config.json (or ~/.nostr/bray.json):
{
"bunkerUriFile": "/Users/you/.nostr/bunker-uri",
"relays": ["wss://relay.damus.io", "wss://nos.lol"],
"trustMode": "annotate"
}Secrets are referenced by file path (bunkerUriFile, secretKeyFile, nwcUriFile) so they never appear in the config itself.
Search order: BRAY_CONFIG env var > $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/bray/config.json > ~/.nostr/bray.json.
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
BRAY_CONFIG |
Path to config file |
BUNKER_URI |
NIP-46 bunker URL (safest) |
BUNKER_URI_FILE |
Path to bunker URI file |
NOSTR_SECRET_KEY |
nsec, hex, or BIP-39 mnemonic |
NOSTR_SECRET_KEY_FILE |
Path to secret key file |
NOSTR_NCRYPTSEC |
NIP-49 encrypted key |
NOSTR_NCRYPTSEC_PASSWORD |
Password for ncryptsec |
NWC_URI_FILE |
Path to a private 0600 file containing the NWC bearer URI |
NOSTR_RELAYS |
Comma-separated relay URLs |
NOSTR_FORBID_PUBKEY |
Comma-separated npubs or hex this process must never sign as. See below. |
TOR_PROXY |
SOCKS5h proxy for Tor |
NIP04_ENABLED |
Set 1 to enable legacy NIP-04 DMs |
TRANSPORT |
stdio (default) or http |
PORT |
HTTP port (default 3000) |
All secret env vars are deleted from process.env before parsing can fail.
Raw NWC_URI is refused; use NWC_URI_FILE or wallet connect <nwc-file> so
the bearer credential never appears in a process environment, command argument
or MCP tool argument.
An agent that comes up holding the wrong key is indistinguishable from one
working correctly. Every signature verifies, every tool succeeds, and the
only symptom is that whoami quietly answers with somebody else's npub —
which the driving model has no reason to doubt, because it is its own tool
telling it.
The worst version is a principal's key: a person's own. An agent signing as its principal can attest that it belongs to itself, and approve its own requests, because it is the principal those checks look for.
NOSTR_FORBID_PUBKEY=npub1yourownkey...,npub1anotherhuman...or forbidPubkeys in the config file. Either takes npubs or hex. Activating
one of those keys throws instead — at startup, on identity-switch, and on
bunker --persona alike, because the check sits at the moment an identity
becomes active rather than at any one entry point. An entry that cannot be
parsed is an error too: a list nobody can read must not silently permit
everything.
The active npub is printed on stderr on every start, so the answer to "which key is this?" does not depend on asking the agent.
zap-send spends through the NWC URI you configured. That URI is an
unbounded capability over the wallet behind it: every method it supports, no
ceiling, until it is rotated. Handing one to an agent hands over everything.
wallet-grant issues connections over the same wallet that are narrower.
wallet-grant { name: "research-agent", methods: ["get_info","pay_invoice"],
budgetMsat: 50000, maxPaymentMsat: 5000 }
wallet-grants # what exists, what it may do, what it has spent
wallet-revoke { nameOrId: "research-agent" }
wallet-refill { nameOrId: "research-agent", budgetMsat: 50000 }
wallet-serve { action: "start" }
What a connection may do is an allowlist, and the default grants no spending
and does not disclose the balance: get_info, make_invoice,
lookup_invoice. Both of the others are opt-in per connection, and a
connection that can spend must carry a budget - there is no unlimited grant
to issue by accident.
The rules exist because a payment cannot be recalled:
- A request is answered once. Its id is persisted before the payment is attempted, so a process that dies mid-payment comes back knowing not to try again - a relay will hand the same signed request over twice.
- Requests on one connection are serialised, so two arriving together cannot both read the same remaining budget.
- A request older than five minutes is not answered, whatever its own
expirationtag claims. - Each connection has its own service key: two grants share nothing a relay can correlate, and revoking one is deleting a key.
- The budget is charged what the invoice says, decoded here. A budget checked against a figure the payer supplied is not a budget.
- A claimed payment whose preimage does not settle the invoice is refused rather than passed on. Repeating an unproven claim would make this service the one telling the lie.
Grants live in wallet-grants.json (0600, per identity), and they are
answered only while wallet-serve is running - which is to say, only for
as long as this process is alive. That is worth telling whoever you hand a URI
to: a connection that works while an MCP session is open is a different
promise from one that works overnight.
npx nostr-bray whoami # show your npub
npx nostr-bray post "hello from bray!" # publish a note
npx nostr-bray persona work # derive a work persona
npx nostr-bray prove blind # create a linkage proof
npx nostr-bray --help # see all commands- Usage Guide -- walkthroughs for identity, DMs, attestations, payments, and duress
- Examples -- MCP config files and CLI workflow scripts
- Contributing -- setup, architecture, testing, and conventions
See llms.txt for a concise summary optimised for AI context windows, or llms-full.txt for complete tool documentation with parameter details.
ForgeSworn builds open-source cryptographic identity, payments, and coordination tools for Nostr.
| Library | What it does |
|---|---|
| nsec-tree | Deterministic sub-identity derivation |
| ring-sig | SAG/LSAG ring signatures on secp256k1 |
| range-proof | Pedersen commitment range proofs |
| canary-kit | Coercion-resistant spoken verification |
| spoken-token | Human-speakable verification tokens |
| toll-booth | L402 payment middleware |
| geohash-kit | Geohash toolkit with polygon coverage |
| nostr-attestations | NIP-VA verifiable attestations |
| dominion | Epoch-based encrypted access control |
| nostr-veil | Privacy-preserving Web of Trust |
MIT