Combine 2357 2358 2359 by MarcusSorealheis · Pull Request #2362 · TraceMachina/nativelink

MarcusSorealheis · 2026-05-23T00:25:03Z

Description

Combines #2357 #2358 #2359 for testing.

This change is

The recursive permission walk `set_perms_recursive_impl` (driving both `set_readonly_recursive` and `set_dir_writable_recursive`) used `fs::metadata` (stat), which follows symlinks. On input trees containing symlinks - e.g. `.venv/bin/python3` produced by rules_python / rules_apple venv tooling - this had two failure modes: * A symlink to a directory reported `is_dir() == true`, so the walk recursed *through* the link, escaping the materialized tree or descending into an unrelated directory. * A symlink was passed to `set_permissions`; `chmod` follows symlinks, so it mutated the link's target. When the target did not exist (a dangling link - common when a venv points outside the action's input set) the `chmod` returned ENOENT and failed the entire walk. That ENOENT failure surfaced as `set_readonly_recursive` erroring inside `DirectoryCache::get_or_create`, which made `prepare_action_inputs` log "Directory cache failed, falling back to traditional download" and take the slow `download_to_directory` path. Fix: `set_perms_recursive_impl` now uses `symlink_metadata` (lstat) and returns early on symlink entries - it never chmods a symlink and never recurses through one. Regular files keep their existing read-only (0o555) treatment, so the CAS-hardlinked-inode hermeticity contract (PR #2347) is unchanged. `hardlink_directory_tree_recursive` already recreated symlinks as symlinks; its symlink branch is reordered ahead of the `is_dir()` / `is_file()` branches to make the symlink-first intent explicit and robust. Adds regression tests covering set-readonly, set-dir-writable, and hardlink/clone walks over a tree containing a symlink to an in-tree file, a dangling relative symlink, and a symlink to an in-tree directory, asserting each walk succeeds and the symlinks are preserved with their targets intact. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

`DirectoryCache` locks each cache entry down with `set_readonly_recursive` after construction. Previously that helper made the entire entry tree mode 0o555 — directories included — so every materialization had to follow up with a separate `set_dir_writable_recursive` recursive chmod walk in `prepare_action_inputs` to re-add write permission to directories (Bazel actions declare outputs at paths nested inside input subdirectories). That post-walk is redundant work. Directories are not hardlink-shared between cache entries — only file content inodes are — so directory mode can safely be made writable once, at the cache entry, instead of on every materialization. `set_readonly_recursive` now locks a tree down as a cache entry by making only FILES read-only (0o555) and leaving DIRECTORIES writable (0o755). Both materialization paths then produce a directly-usable tree: - macOS `clonefile(2)` copies the source's modes verbatim, so the clone's directories are writable and its files read-only. - The Linux per-file hardlink walk creates fresh directories (writable) and hardlinks files (which keep the source inode's read-only mode). Files stay read-only on both paths, so the hermeticity contract and the CAS-hardlink shared-inode invariant (PR #2347) are preserved. With the materialized tree already correct, the `set_dir_writable_recursive` call is removed from `prepare_action_inputs`. `set_dir_writable_recursive` itself is unchanged and still used by the cache eviction cleanup path. Tests: - fs_util: `test_set_readonly_recursive` now also asserts directories stay writable; the macOS clonefile tests assert cloned subdirs are writable and that a nested output can be created with no `set_dir_writable_recursive` walk; `test_set_dir_writable_recursive_walks_nested_dirs` keeps covering the eviction-cleanup helper. - directory_cache: new `test_materialized_tree_dirs_writable_files_readonly` builds a nested tree and asserts that, after `get_or_create` on both the fresh-materialize and cache-hit paths, every directory is writable and every file is read-only, with no separate chmod walk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

`DirectoryCache::construct_directory` previously materialized every file by fetching the whole blob into RAM (`get_part_unchunked`) and writing a full copy (`fs::write`). For a cache that exists to avoid re-fetching from the CAS, this is the dominant cost on a miss. Switch the cache-entry file build to hardlink the FilesystemStore CAS blob directly into the cache entry — zero-copy, metadata-only — exactly the way `download_to_directory` already does on the fallback path: `populate_fast_store` then `get_file_entry_for_digest` / `get_file_path_locked` / `fs::hard_link`. Correctness: * A hardlinked CAS blob shares its inode with the CAS store and every other action that hardlinked the same blob, so it must never be chmod'd (the inode-corruption bug PR #2347 fixed). Executable files (`FileNode.is_executable`) therefore get their own private inode via fetch+write and are chmod'd 0o555 on that unshared copy — never hardlinked. * When the blob is not locally hardlinkable (the fast tier is not a FilesystemStore, or the blob is absent / evicted from it), the file falls back to fetch+write rather than failing the build. * Zero-byte files keep their existing direct-write special case. * The post-construction lockdown switches from `set_readonly_recursive` (which chmods files, and would corrupt the shared CAS inode) to `set_dir_writable_recursive`, which only touches directories. `DirectoryCache::new` now takes the worker's `Arc<FastSlowStore>` so it can reach `populate_fast_store` and downcast the fast tier to FilesystemStore. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

After `construct_directory`, the cache-miss path walked the materialized tree twice more: `calculate_directory_size` (an `fs::metadata` per file) to compute the LRU size, and a recursive permission pass to normalize directory modes. Both are now folded into construction itself. Size: `construct_directory` returns the total tree size, accumulated from `FileNode.digest.size_bytes` in the `Directory` protos it already decodes. This is also more correct than the old filesystem walk — it counts each file once by its CAS size and never follows symlinks into possibly-shared or external targets. Symlinks contribute nothing. Directory mode: each cache-entry directory is chmod'd 0o755 the moment it is created (`create_dir_writable`), umask-independent. The directory is writable while it is populated and that is its stable final mode, so the separate post-construction `set_dir_writable_recursive` walk is gone. Cache-entry files are still never chmod'd here — they may be CAS-blob hardlinks (OPT #1) and mutating their mode would corrupt the shared inode. Reconciliation with PR #2357: that PR reworks `set_readonly_recursive` so the recursive walk leaves dirs 0o755 / files 0o555. This commit removes the directory-cache build's dependence on any such recursive walk entirely — modes are set at creation. Whichever lands second, the rebase is a straight delete of the now-unused call site; there is no semantic conflict because both converge on 0o755 directories, and #2357's file handling is irrelevant here since the cache build no longer touches file modes at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

The cache write lock was held across syscall-heavy I/O, serializing every concurrent `get_or_create`: * On the cache-hit paths, `cache.write()` was held across the whole `hardlink_directory_tree` (clonefile / per-file hardlink) materialization. * `evict_lru` ran `set_dir_writable_recursive` + `remove_dir_all` on the evicted tree under the write lock during a cache miss. Lock narrowing: * `acquire_entry` / `release_entry` take the write lock only to bump and drop a `ref_count` pin and snapshot the entry path; the `hardlink_directory_tree` materialization runs fully unlocked. The pin is what makes this safe — `evict_lru` never selects an entry with `ref_count > 0`, so the cache tree cannot be deleted mid-hardlink. The newly constructed entry is likewise inserted pre-pinned (`ref_count: 1`) and unpinned only after its destination hardlink completes; otherwise a concurrent miss for an unrelated digest could evict the brand-new entry (its `last_access` is recent but it is the only unpinned one) while this caller is still hardlinking from it. * `evict_if_needed` / `evict_lru` are now pure in-memory: they select victims and remove them from the map under the lock, returning the victim paths. `dispatch_evictions` then performs the chmod + removal on a `background_spawn` task, off the lock. Single-flight: the existing per-digest construction mutex already ensures a digest is constructed once while N callers wait; this commit additionally unmaps the per-digest mutex (`forget_construction_lock`) once construction finishes so `construction_locks` no longer grows unbounded over the worker's lifetime. Unmapping is race-free: a waiter has already cloned the `Arc<Mutex>` before blocking, and a late arrival that creates a fresh mutex still re-checks the cache, finds the entry, and takes the fast hardlink path — never a redundant construct. `ref_count` / `CachedDirectoryMetadata` semantics are unchanged; the hit/miss return contract is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

MarcusSorealheis · 2026-05-23T00:54:54Z

Finally testing after three hours with Mac OS apps compiling on Macs:

MarcusSorealheis · 2026-05-23T18:01:46Z

One test fails for me locally— and it's a genuine PR interaction, not a merge slip: 2359 deletes 2357's set_readonly_recursive post-walk and hardlinks CAS blobs instead, but nativelink-store's FilesystemStore writes blobs at 0o644 (writable) and create_file only chmods to read-only for executables. So combined, materialized input files are writable, violating 2357's hermeticity contract (test_materialized_tree_dirs_writable_files_readonly). Each PR passes its own tests; only combining surfaces it. This needs a design call (make CAS blobs read-only at rest / private read-only inodes / relax the contract) — I did not silently pick one.

I am in favor of CAS blobs read only because the main complaints are hermeticity and the time spent waiting on fetch. I've made that change and a change to a test that now fails because of an attempt to execute stat on an inode after a file had been changed to read only.

MarcusSorealheis · 2026-05-24T00:11:11Z

We have observed some performance gains when building an iOS app, as have members of the community like the co-author of this PR.

Before: download_to_directory materialized an executable input by hard_link (then
chmod). A hardlink opens no writable fd.
- After this change: executables take the private-copy path — std::fs::copy(src, dst) in download_to_directory (and tokio::fs::write in the cache's copy_file_to). A
  copy opens the destination for writing.

So the change introduces a transient writable fd to executables into the worker's hot, highly-concurrent materialization path. That is a classic ETXTBSY trigger from the early days of Bazel, because the worker runs many actions concurrently and spawns subprocesses with fork+execve tokio::process … .spawn() ~ line 1331.

I asked the native GitHub clanker to break it down, and it missed the plot hard. So I went to Claude for the breakdown of their own handy work and got this:

Action A is mid-std::fs::copy of builder → a writable fd to that inode is open.
Action B forks for its own spawn during that window → B's child inherits A's
still-open writable fd (fork copies all fds; O_CLOEXEC only closes it at the child's
own execve, not before).
Action A (or anyone hardlinked to that inode) execves builder before B's child
execs → ETXTBSY.

The old hardlink path never opened a writer fd for executables, so it couldn't hit
this. Your change traded the #2347 shared-inode-chmod problem for a new
write-fd-in-the-hot-path problem. That's why it's intermittent and why it shows up
under the heavy parallelism of bazel test //... with rules_go's builder.

Caveats (so you can confirm rather than assume):

ETXTBSY with the rules_go builder is also a well-known flake in high-parallelism
Bazel builds independent of NativeLink. So: does it reproduce on re-run? Is it
deterministic? Does it appear on the combine branch but not on plain main? If it's
branch-specific and recurs, that's strong confirmation it's the change.
The directory-cache path is less suspect than download_to_directory: there the copy
happens once during construction (fd closed before the entry is inserted) and
materialization is hardlink-only. The fresh per-action std::fs::copy in
download_to_directory is the prime suspect.

I'll continue pursue a patch after releasing this version because it is also working well.

MarcusSorealheis · 2026-05-25T21:51:26Z

closing in favor of #2366 , which improves upon the optimizations here with some stability improvements.

* util: make permission walks symlink-safe The recursive permission walk `set_perms_recursive_impl` (driving both `set_readonly_recursive` and `set_dir_writable_recursive`) used `fs::metadata` (stat), which follows symlinks. On input trees containing symlinks - e.g. `.venv/bin/python3` produced by rules_python / rules_apple venv tooling - this had two failure modes: * A symlink to a directory reported `is_dir() == true`, so the walk recursed *through* the link, escaping the materialized tree or descending into an unrelated directory. * A symlink was passed to `set_permissions`; `chmod` follows symlinks, so it mutated the link's target. When the target did not exist (a dangling link - common when a venv points outside the action's input set) the `chmod` returned ENOENT and failed the entire walk. That ENOENT failure surfaced as `set_readonly_recursive` erroring inside `DirectoryCache::get_or_create`, which made `prepare_action_inputs` log "Directory cache failed, falling back to traditional download" and take the slow `download_to_directory` path. Fix: `set_perms_recursive_impl` now uses `symlink_metadata` (lstat) and returns early on symlink entries - it never chmods a symlink and never recurses through one. Regular files keep their existing read-only (0o555) treatment, so the CAS-hardlinked-inode hermeticity contract (PR #2347) is unchanged. `hardlink_directory_tree_recursive` already recreated symlinks as symlinks; its symlink branch is reordered ahead of the `is_dir()` / `is_file()` branches to make the symlink-first intent explicit and robust. Adds regression tests covering set-readonly, set-dir-writable, and hardlink/clone walks over a tree containing a symlink to an in-tree file, a dangling relative symlink, and a symlink to an in-tree directory, asserting each walk succeeds and the symlinks are preserved with their targets intact. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * worker: make directory-cache entries already-writable `DirectoryCache` locks each cache entry down with `set_readonly_recursive` after construction. Previously that helper made the entire entry tree mode 0o555 — directories included — so every materialization had to follow up with a separate `set_dir_writable_recursive` recursive chmod walk in `prepare_action_inputs` to re-add write permission to directories (Bazel actions declare outputs at paths nested inside input subdirectories). That post-walk is redundant work. Directories are not hardlink-shared between cache entries — only file content inodes are — so directory mode can safely be made writable once, at the cache entry, instead of on every materialization. `set_readonly_recursive` now locks a tree down as a cache entry by making only FILES read-only (0o555) and leaving DIRECTORIES writable (0o755). Both materialization paths then produce a directly-usable tree: - macOS `clonefile(2)` copies the source's modes verbatim, so the clone's directories are writable and its files read-only. - The Linux per-file hardlink walk creates fresh directories (writable) and hardlinks files (which keep the source inode's read-only mode). Files stay read-only on both paths, so the hermeticity contract and the CAS-hardlink shared-inode invariant (PR #2347) are preserved. With the materialized tree already correct, the `set_dir_writable_recursive` call is removed from `prepare_action_inputs`. `set_dir_writable_recursive` itself is unchanged and still used by the cache eviction cleanup path. Tests: - fs_util: `test_set_readonly_recursive` now also asserts directories stay writable; the macOS clonefile tests assert cloned subdirs are writable and that a nested output can be created with no `set_dir_writable_recursive` walk; `test_set_dir_writable_recursive_walks_nested_dirs` keeps covering the eviction-cleanup helper. - directory_cache: new `test_materialized_tree_dirs_writable_files_readonly` builds a nested tree and asserts that, after `get_or_create` on both the fresh-materialize and cache-hit paths, every directory is writable and every file is read-only, with no separate chmod walk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * worker: hardlink CAS blobs in directory-cache construct `DirectoryCache::construct_directory` previously materialized every file by fetching the whole blob into RAM (`get_part_unchunked`) and writing a full copy (`fs::write`). For a cache that exists to avoid re-fetching from the CAS, this is the dominant cost on a miss. Switch the cache-entry file build to hardlink the FilesystemStore CAS blob directly into the cache entry — zero-copy, metadata-only — exactly the way `download_to_directory` already does on the fallback path: `populate_fast_store` then `get_file_entry_for_digest` / `get_file_path_locked` / `fs::hard_link`. Correctness: * A hardlinked CAS blob shares its inode with the CAS store and every other action that hardlinked the same blob, so it must never be chmod'd (the inode-corruption bug PR #2347 fixed). Executable files (`FileNode.is_executable`) therefore get their own private inode via fetch+write and are chmod'd 0o555 on that unshared copy — never hardlinked. * When the blob is not locally hardlinkable (the fast tier is not a FilesystemStore, or the blob is absent / evicted from it), the file falls back to fetch+write rather than failing the build. * Zero-byte files keep their existing direct-write special case. * The post-construction lockdown switches from `set_readonly_recursive` (which chmods files, and would corrupt the shared CAS inode) to `set_dir_writable_recursive`, which only touches directories. `DirectoryCache::new` now takes the worker's `Arc<FastSlowStore>` so it can reach `populate_fast_store` and downcast the fast tier to FilesystemStore. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * worker: drop the two redundant full-tree walks in directory-cache build After `construct_directory`, the cache-miss path walked the materialized tree twice more: `calculate_directory_size` (an `fs::metadata` per file) to compute the LRU size, and a recursive permission pass to normalize directory modes. Both are now folded into construction itself. Size: `construct_directory` returns the total tree size, accumulated from `FileNode.digest.size_bytes` in the `Directory` protos it already decodes. This is also more correct than the old filesystem walk — it counts each file once by its CAS size and never follows symlinks into possibly-shared or external targets. Symlinks contribute nothing. Directory mode: each cache-entry directory is chmod'd 0o755 the moment it is created (`create_dir_writable`), umask-independent. The directory is writable while it is populated and that is its stable final mode, so the separate post-construction `set_dir_writable_recursive` walk is gone. Cache-entry files are still never chmod'd here — they may be CAS-blob hardlinks (OPT #1) and mutating their mode would corrupt the shared inode. Reconciliation with PR #2357: that PR reworks `set_readonly_recursive` so the recursive walk leaves dirs 0o755 / files 0o555. This commit removes the directory-cache build's dependence on any such recursive walk entirely — modes are set at creation. Whichever lands second, the rebase is a straight delete of the now-unused call site; there is no semantic conflict because both converge on 0o755 directories, and #2357's file handling is irrelevant here since the cache build no longer touches file modes at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * worker: narrow the directory-cache lock and single-flight construction The cache write lock was held across syscall-heavy I/O, serializing every concurrent `get_or_create`: * On the cache-hit paths, `cache.write()` was held across the whole `hardlink_directory_tree` (clonefile / per-file hardlink) materialization. * `evict_lru` ran `set_dir_writable_recursive` + `remove_dir_all` on the evicted tree under the write lock during a cache miss. Lock narrowing: * `acquire_entry` / `release_entry` take the write lock only to bump and drop a `ref_count` pin and snapshot the entry path; the `hardlink_directory_tree` materialization runs fully unlocked. The pin is what makes this safe — `evict_lru` never selects an entry with `ref_count > 0`, so the cache tree cannot be deleted mid-hardlink. The newly constructed entry is likewise inserted pre-pinned (`ref_count: 1`) and unpinned only after its destination hardlink completes; otherwise a concurrent miss for an unrelated digest could evict the brand-new entry (its `last_access` is recent but it is the only unpinned one) while this caller is still hardlinking from it. * `evict_if_needed` / `evict_lru` are now pure in-memory: they select victims and remove them from the map under the lock, returning the victim paths. `dispatch_evictions` then performs the chmod + removal on a `background_spawn` task, off the lock. Single-flight: the existing per-digest construction mutex already ensures a digest is constructed once while N callers wait; this commit additionally unmaps the per-digest mutex (`forget_construction_lock`) once construction finishes so `construction_locks` no longer grows unbounded over the worker's lifetime. Unmapping is race-free: a waiter has already cloned the `Arc<Mutex>` before blocking, and a late arrival that creates a fresh mutex still re-checks the cache, finds the entry, and takes the fast hardlink path — never a redundant construct. `ref_count` / `CachedDirectoryMetadata` semantics are unchanged; the hit/miss return contract is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * address merge interactions with read-only CAS * remove inode stat in test * update dependencies to 1.3.1 * worker: materialize executable inputs by hardlink to a created-once 0o555 variant (fix ETXTBSY) Materializing an executable input via a per-action `std::fs::copy` opened a writable fd in the worker's hot prepare path. Under fork-heavy concurrency a sibling action's forked child could inherit that fd, and a concurrent `execve` of the executable then failed with `ETXTBSY` ("Text file busy", os error 26) — seen on Linux RBE (k8) building rules_go's `builder`. macOS was largely shielded because its directory-cache path uses APFS `clonefile(2)` (a distinct COW inode per action), but the per-file `download_to_directory` fallback hardlinks on both platforms, so the regression spanned both. Fix (keep the hot path hardlink-only — no writable fd): - nativelink-store: add `FilesystemStore::get_executable_hardlink_source`. The CAS blob is read-only 0o444 and shared by hardlink, so it cannot carry +x and must never be chmod'd (#2347). This creates a per-digest 0o555 variant exactly once (single-flight), copy -> chmod -> fsync -> atomic rename, so the writer fd is closed before the inode is ever hardlinked or executed. Stored in a sibling `{content_path}.exec` dir (ignored by the content/temp scan + prune) and cleared on startup. On APFS the copy is itself a `clonefile`. - download_to_directory: executables now hardlink that shared 0o555 variant and non-executables hardlink the 0o444 CAS blob. A private copy is used only for the rare custom unix_mode / mtime case, applied to a private inode. The macOS `clonefile` materialization (`hardlink_directory_tree`, #2349) and the directory cache's executable handling are left untouched, preserving the macOS speedup. Test: executable_hardlink_source_created_once_and_readonly asserts the variant is 0o555, a separate inode from the 0o444 blob, stable across calls, leaves the blob untouched, and hardlinks into an executable. nativelink-store 243/0, nativelink-worker 88/0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * filesystem_store: use nativelink spawn_blocking! macro (clippy disallowed_methods) tokio::task::spawn_blocking is banned by clippy.toml in favor of nativelink-util's spawn_blocking! macro (adds the tracing span + JoinHandleDropGuard). Fixes the -D clippy::disallowed-methods CI failure on get_executable_hardlink_source's executable-variant creation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * filesystem_store: gate executable-variant machinery to unix (fix Windows build) The executable 0o555 variant (and its single-flight map, variant path, .exec dir, and spawn_blocking copy) only exists to carry the unix executable bit and dodge the unix ETXTBSY race. On Windows it was dead code, failing the build under -D warnings (unused import spawn_blocking, never-read executable_locks, never-used executable_variant_path). Gate all of it (and the HashMap / Mutex / EXECUTABLE_DIR_SUFFIX it pulls in) behind #[cfg(unix)]; the existing #[cfg(not(unix))] get_executable_hardlink_source just hardlinks the CAS blob. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Ernesto Cambuston <e.cambuston@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

erneestoc and others added 5 commits May 22, 2026 16:11

MarcusSorealheis requested a review from amankrx May 23, 2026 00:25

MarcusSorealheis added 2 commits May 23, 2026 00:08

address merge interactions with read-only CAS

5b31e1a

remove inode stat in test

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MarcusSorealheis added 2 commits May 23, 2026 14:09

update dependencies to 1.3.1

a2488ec

Merge branch 'main' into combine-2357-2358-2359

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MarcusSorealheis temporarily deployed to production May 23, 2026 21:10 — with GitHub Actions Inactive

Merge branch 'main' into combine-2357-2358-2359

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MarcusSorealheis temporarily deployed to production May 25, 2026 07:46 — with GitHub Actions Inactive

MarcusSorealheis closed this May 25, 2026

MarcusSorealheis mentioned this pull request May 26, 2026

worker: faster directory-cache materialization — hardlink CAS blobs, drop redundant walks, narrow lock #2359

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Combine 2357 2358 2359#2362

Combine 2357 2358 2359#2362
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