Method: read the code, built it from a clean venv, ran the tests, ran the app. Not an independent audit.
Python 3.13 / PySide6 desktop vault (nomorepwn/ core, nomorepwn_app/ GUI), SQLite storage, PyInstaller + Inno Setup packaging, CI (lint, tests, manual release). Groups, history, generator, search, auto-lock, backup/restore, recovery kit, opt-in breach check, updater and audit view exist in code. There is no browser extension or native-messaging host.
- From source:
python -m venv .venv,pip install -r requirements.txt,python -m nomorepwn_app. Works. - Packaged:
pyinstaller build/NoMorePwn.specproduceddist/NoMorePwn.exe(single file, Windows). - Tests: Python unittest suite under
tests/(seescripts/verify.sh).
| Area | Finding |
|---|---|
| KDF | Argon2id t=3, m=64 MiB, p=4, 16-byte random salt; PBKDF2-SHA256 600k fallback; parameters bounds-checked before use. Sound. |
| Encryption | AES-256-GCM via cryptography, fresh random 96-bit nonce per seal, AAD binds row and field. Sound. |
| Key storage | Derived key in memory only while unlocked; never written. Python cannot zeroize it. |
| Clipboard | Auto-clear after 20 s only if unchanged; Windows history/cloud exclusion hints applied. |
| Single-instance IPC | Local socket, current user only, per-install 256-bit token (constant-time compare). Accepts authenticated show only — no credential writes over IPC. |
| Logs | No logging of secrets found (no logging of credentials; grep clean). |
| Dependencies | pip-audit on requirements.txt: 0 known vulnerabilities at prior review. Version ranges, no hash lock. |
- Critical: none found.
- High: none found in the vault design.
- Medium (fixed): clipboard copies were eligible for Windows Win+V history and cloud clipboard.
- Medium (open): service names, usernames, groups are plaintext in SQLite; KDF params unauthenticated; no unlock rate limit; master password not Unicode-normalized (changing it would break existing vaults, so not changed); installers unsigned, deps not hash-locked.